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The New Activist Non-Profits:  
Four Models Breaking from the  
Non-Profit Industrial Complex 
MICHAEL HABER* 
Twenty-first century activists—inspired by recent social 
movements and criticisms of the “non-profit industrial com-
plex”—have increasingly sought to avoid pursuing their ac-
tivism through the hierarchical, professionally managed 
non-profit corporations that have been the norm for social 
justice organizations since the 1970s. While many of these 
activist groups have chosen to remain unincorporated, some 
activists have been experimenting with new, innovative 
structures for non-profit organizations, structures that aim 
to better align activists’ organizations with their values. This 
Article presents four models of activist non-profits: (1) soci-
ocratic non-profits, (2) worker self-directed non-profits, (3) 
hub-and-spoke counter-institutions, and (4) swarm organi-
zations. It describes how these approaches increase volun-
teer participation, deepen organizational democracy, con-
nect more closely with social movements, and aim to main-
tain accountability among and between organizational 
members and other stakeholders. It presents legal con-
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straints on the governance structures of these new organiza-
tions and concludes with a description of some best practices 
for these groups and their lawyers.   
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INTRODUCTION 
From the early nineteenth century through the 1950s and 1960s, 
American civic life was dominated by membership-led organiza-
tions that made little distinction between charity, civic participation, 
political activities, religious events, opportunities for socializing, 
and mutual aid and support for fellow members.1 For over a century, 
                                                                                                         
 1  The earliest colonial settlers of North America formed associations ranging 
from large, quasi-governmental bodies to all sorts of local charitable and volun-
tary associations, including hospitals, fire departments, orphanages, and other 
groups. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Per-
spective, STAT. INCOME BULL. 105 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehis-
tory.pdf;  see THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO 
MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 30–40 (2003); see, e.g., PETER DOBKIN 
HALL, A HISTORY OF NONPROFIT BOARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2003) 
(ebook),  http://beech.ait.fredonia.edu/nfp/ReadingRoom/PDFs/BoardSource-A 
HistoryOfNonprofitBoardsInTheUnitedStates.pdf (describing the Massachusetts 
Bay Company, a quasi-governmental corporation formed to help govern the new 
Massachusetts colony) [hereinafter HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS]. 
By the 1830s, immigrants new to the United States from countries like Ger-
many and Ireland formed their own social and voluntary associations, and the Ro-
man Catholic Church began a network of churches, schools, orphanages, and 
other institutions to serve members. Peter Dobkin Hall, Historical Perspectives 
on Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, in THE JOSSEY-BASS HANDBOOK 
OF NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 8 (David O. Renz ed., 4th ed. 
2016) [hereinafter Hall, Perspectives]. Women’s groups—commonly focused on 
funding missionary work, engaging in local charity, promoting temperance, dis-
tributing Bibles, and providing basic education, clothing and shoes to working 
children—appeared in towns and cities across the country, often led by the women 
of the most prominent local families. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, NATURAL ALLIES: 
WOMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12–13 (1991) (describing 
women’s associations). These associations were so prominent in U.S. civic life in 
the 1830s that the French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville would famously write: 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, con-
stantly form associations. They have not only commercial and 
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it would not have been unusual for a single organization to provide 
charity for the poor, promote temperance in its local community, 
fund missionary work abroad, sponsor dinners and social events, 
support candidates for local office, and provide mutual aid to help 
members in need.2 The groups organizing these diverse activities 
took a variety of forms: professionals and wealthy elites participated 
in business leagues and professional associations; workers joined la-
bor unions and, sometimes, socialist or communist leagues; veterans 
joined veterans’ groups; men across social and economic classes 
joined fraternal organizations including the Elks, Masons, Moose, 
and others; women joined women’s federations and temperance 
groups; and African-Americans, Jews, Catholics, recent immi-
grants, and others joined fraternal, sororal, and religious associa-
tions that brought together members of their racial, ethnic, religious, 
or other identity group for varied activities and purposes, crossing 
later-hardened boundaries between charity, mutual benefit associa-
tion, civic organization, social club, and political alliance.3  
                                                                                                         
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associa-
tions of a thousand other kinds, — religious, moral, serious, fu-
tile . . . . Whenever, at the head of some new undertaking, you 
see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in 
the United States you will be sure to find an association.  
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA129–30 (Francis Bowen ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge Univ. Press: Sever & Francis 1864) (1835). 
 2  See SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 78, 84–85, 112–13 (describing voluntary 
associations as places for socializing, building community, providing charity for 
widows and orphans, as well as mutual aid for the families of members, and as 
outlets for political involvement); see, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 1, at 13 (describing 
varied activities of women’s voluntary associations).  
 3  SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 173. Skocpol largely overlooks the history of 
socialist and communist organizations that parallels the historical rise and fall of 
many of these other organizations between the late nineteenth century and the 
mid-twentieth century. This ignores the important history of labor and left-wing 
political organizations that also faded in prominence in the decades after World 
War II. See HARVEY KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE DE-
PRESSION DECADE 384–85 (1984) (describing how the International Workers Or-
der developed a membership of about 150,000 people, in addition to the member-
ship of the Communist Party USA and the Socialist Party of America, which to-
gether had close to another 100,000 members).  
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But since the 1950s and 1960s, this universe of civic- and com-
munity-minded, multipurpose member-driven organizations has 
nearly disappeared.4 There are multiple reasons for the decline of 
these groups: suburbanization;5 women’s entry into the workforce 
in greater numbers;6 in the case of socialist and communist groups, 
the Second Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s7 and, by the 1970s, a 
growing disillusionment with the radical leftist party as a vehicle for 
social change;8 the rapid decline of labor unions in the United States 
since the 1960s;9 the feelings of anxiety, instability, and financial 
                                                                                                         
 4  SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 174 (arguing that “[a] new civic America has 
thus taken shape since the 1960s, as professionally managed advocacy groups and 
institutions have moved to the fore, while representatively governed, nation-span-
ning voluntary membership federations—especially those with popular or cross-
class memberships—have lost clout in national public affairs and faded from the 
everyday lives of most Americans”). There are a few notable exceptions of vol-
untary groups with local chapters that remain influential to some degree, like the 
National Rifle Association and Veterans of Foreign Wars. Id. at 153, 157. 
 5  ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 210 (2000). Following World War II, many white people 
left cities for suburban communities, and, with that shift, tended to shift from 
commuting by mass transit to isolated transportation in cars, and from public en-
tertainment like going to the movies and participation in civic life to private en-
tertainment, especially watching television. Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 
21; PUTNAM, supra, at 211–14, 223.  
 6  SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 198–99; PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 194–95. 
Women, especially highly-educated women, were an important part of many vol-
untary associations, both those with all-women members and those open to both 
men and women. Id. at 203. As these women entered the private workforce in 
greater numbers, national civic organizations lost much of their skilled volunteer 
labor and, quickly, their power. Id.  
 7  M.J. HEALE, MCCARTHY’S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN STATE 
AND NATION, 1935–1965, at 6 (1998) (describing the impact of the Second Red 
Scare). 
 8  JODI DEAN, CROWDS AND PARTY 22–23 (2016) (arguing that “by the 1970s 
and ‘80s, . . . wide swathes of the Left had become convinced that the party form 
was no longer adequate to left aspirations” and attributing this change to “the 
stagnation and authoritarianism of the party-states of the former East; the com-
plicity and betrayals of communist and socialist parties in the former West; [and] 
the failure of class analysis to address and include the politics of identity, partic-
ularly with respect to sex and race”). 
 9  MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED 
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pressure that increasingly became the norm for American working 
families since the 1970s and 1980s;10 a generational shift in interest 
away from civic organizations among people coming into adulthood 
in the 1970s and later;11 organizations tied to the civil rights move-
ment, feminist movement, and other social movements of the 1960s 
moving away from mass-membership advocacy models;12 the rise 
of private foundations and the related shift toward the dominance of 
more sophisticated, centralized non-profit management;13 changes 
                                                                                                         
STATES 17 (1987) (noting that while some public sector unions have made gains, 
there was a “substantial absolute decline . . . in union membership in the private 
sector during the two decades from 1960 to 1980”); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, 
STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 16 (2002) (describing 
organized labor as one-third as strong as it was in 1953, and only one-fourth as 
strong in the private sector). 
 10  PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 189. 
 11  Id. at 255.  
 12  Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 21 (citing SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 
136–38). The civil rights movement, feminist movement, and other social move-
ments of the 1960s were the efforts of new alliances between grassroots protesters, 
radical activists, and progressive, policy-oriented groups. Id. at 138. Often, the 
organizations playing leading roles in these movements “were not membership 
associations at all. They were small combinations of nimble, fresh-thinking, and 
passionate advocates of new causes.” Id. 
 13  Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 19–20. Even before this, Andrew Car-
negie, one of the richest men in America, was deeply concerned about socialist 
and other radical activism in the 1870s and 1880s, including the rise of labor union 
militancy, the national railroad strike, the riots of 1877, and the 1886 campaign 
for a ten-hour workday that culminated in the Chicago Haymarket bombing that 
killed twelve policemen. Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 11–12. Carnegie 
wrote a series of influential articles in the 1880s that urged his fellow industrialist 
millionaires to reinvest their money in social goods to help eliminate this eco-
nomic strife, writing that these new capitalist elites were men with a “genius for 
affairs” who should use that genius to help ameliorate social ills, rather than fund-
ing traditional charity. Id.; see ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Gospel of Wealth, in THE 
GOSPEL OF WEALTH, AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 15 (1901). As more and more 
of the new class of incredibly wealthy industrialists formed charitable trusts and, 
later, private foundations, it became increasingly common for businesspeople to 
dominate the Boards of Directors of universities, private foundations, and the 
new, large charities that formed in the early twentieth century like the Red Cross 
and Community Chest (which later became United Way). HALL, NONPROFIT 
BOARDS, supra note 1, at 18–19; Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 12. 
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in non-profit law and regulation that required additional sophistica-
tion from non-profit Boards;14 a new attention to the mechanics of 
how to lead a successful non-profit, which led to a greater focus on 
having education and sophistication among non-profit leadership;15 
and the growth of a unique welfare state that increasingly relied on 
state-funded non-profit organizations to provide social safety net 
                                                                                                         
 14  Groups that were “organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which insures to the 
benefit of any private stockholder or individual” had been exempt from tax since 
the Revenue Act of 1909, and deductions for charitable contributions had been 
offered since the Revenue Act of 1917. Arnsberger et al., supra note 1, at 107. 
But by the 1950s and 1960s, a struggle over the business activities of non-profits 
resulted in both a liberalizing of state non-profit corporate laws and an increased 
emphasis on regulation through the IRS. Id. Federally, through the Revenue Act 
of 1950, which limited tax-exempt organizations in their abilities to earn unrelated 
business income, and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which created a new regime 
of registration, reporting, and accountability for non-profits, tax law created a new 
need for tax-exempt entities to hire lawyers and accountants to manage their legal 
and fiscal compliance. Id. at 107–08; HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 
21. At the same time, state law began to allow for new business activities. The 
influential Model Nonstock Corporation Statute was first released by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1964 and “permitted the establishment of nonprofits for 
any legal purpose – rather than restricting them to charitable, educational, and 
religious” purposes. HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 22. Both in states 
that adopted the model statute and in others that were simply influenced by the 
general trend toward liberalizing the rules on permitted non-profit practices, it 
became increasingly the norm that non-profits could engage in almost any activity 
that a business could, except for the distribution of their profits to owners. Id. 
Whether a non-profit was seeking to engage in business-like activities to enhance 
its revenue or simply trying to continue as a traditional charity in this new regime, 
this new regulatory landscape required additional sophistication from non-profit 
leadership. Id. 
 15  During the Great Depression, President Herbert Hoover promoted volun-
tary organizations and helped to popularize citizen participation in chambers of 
commerce, trade associations, service clubs, and other civic groups. HALL, NON-
PROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 19–20. This emphasis led to a new interest in 
efforts at educating Boards of Directors to improve their governance, leading to a 
“virtual explosion of interest in governance in specialized journals” and a new 
focus on managerial professionalism for non-profits. Id. at 20–21. 
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services, which led to the expansion of professional staff to manage 
those programs.16  
By the 1970s, a more centralized and hierarchical model 
emerged as the new standard for non-profit organizations.17 The new 
model would come to be marked by several common features: a re-
liance on grants, contracts, and earned income, rather than member 
contributions to fund operations;18 a diminished role for members, 
or the elimination of members entirely, with organizational direction 
set by small and commonly self-perpetuating Boards of Directors;19 
a sophisticated, professional staff, led by professional non-profit 
managers typically supported by policy experts, communications 
specialists, fundraising professionals, and lobbyists;20 a shift in 
power from members and Boards to staff as non-profits looked to 
business management models in which insider Boards often rubber-
stamp the decisions of sophisticated employee leadership;21 and a 
focus on providing specific services or engaging in advocacy, lob-
bying, and public education on specific social or political issues, ra-
ther than on broadly promoting socializing, mutual support, and 
civic participation among group members.22 As this new, profes-
sionalized model came to dominate the non-profit sector, it became 
increasingly easy or desirable to start U.S. non-profit organizations, 
and even as participation in membership-driven organizations dwin-
dled, the number of U.S. non-profit organizations skyrocketed.23 
                                                                                                         
 16  Following World War II, the American welfare state began to expand, but 
did so not through centralized bureaucracies coordinating universal programs, but 
largely through providing funds to state and local programs, direct grants to or-
ganizations, and indirect subsidies for charitable giving, increasing the need for 
trained managers, skilled in budgets and staffing, and able to meet the complex 
demands of external funders. Id. at 21. 
 17  Id. at 21–22. 
 18  Id.; James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law 
and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 665 (1985). 
 19  See HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 21–22; Fishman, supra 
note 18, at 669–70. 
 20  SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 224. 
 21  HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 22  SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 224–26. 
 23  The number of secular, charitable tax-exempt organizations grew from 
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Just as this professionalized non-profit model came to dominate 
non-profit organizations in general, it has become the dominant 
model for social justice and activist organizations since the 1960s or 
1970s, both for organizations that engage in strategic advocacy 
through lobbying, litigation, and other systemic change initiatives,24 
and for community-based organizations that work to make bottom-
up change through service provision, community organizing, and 
grassroots advocacy.25 But by the early 2000s, grassroots activists 
started to become increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the pro-
fessionalized non-profit model as the vehicle for social justice activ-
ism, coming to label the entire framework of these organizations—
from their corporate hierarchy to their treatment of staff, fundraising 
models, and lack of robust community participation—the “non-
profit industrial complex.”26 These activists argue that professional-
ized non-profits cannot meaningfully engage in confrontational 
grassroots community activism and politicized service provision 
aimed at social change while also fundraising, complying with gov-
ernment regulations, and appeasing grantors.27 They argue that a se-
ries of interrelated structural problems doom professionalized non-
                                                                                                         
50,000 in 1950 to more than 250,000 by the mid-1960s, and more than 1 million 
by the mid-1980s. HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 21. By 2010, there 
were an estimated 2.3 million non-profit organizations in the United States. AMY 
S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, 
GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 1 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publication/25901/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief-Public-
Charities-Giving-and-Volunteering-.PDF. 
 24  See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text. 
 25  Michael Haber, CED After #OWS: From Community Economic Develop-
ment to Anti-authoritarian Community Counter-institutions, 43 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 295, 307–09 (2016). 
 26  Id. at 316; SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, FROM THE BOTTOM UP: STRAT-
EGIES AND PRACTICES FOR MEMBERSHIP-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2013), 
https://srlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SRLP_From_The_Bottom_Up.pdf 
[hereinafter SRLP, FROM THE BOTTOM UP]. See generally Andrea Smith, Intro-
duction to THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT 
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 8–13 (INCITE! ed., 2007) [hereinafter THE REVOLUTION 
WILL NOT BE FUNDED]. 
 27  Haber, supra note 25, at 316. See generally THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT 
BE FUNDED, supra note 26. 
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profits to fail in their social justice missions28: (1) their corporate 
structures necessitate leadership by full-time, professional staff, 
which leads to a need for grant funding that rewards depoliticized 
service provision and disfavors mass mobilization, civil disobedi-
ence, and public support for issues that could be controversial for 
the donor class;29 (2) their reliance on foundation funding forces or-
ganizations to shift their attention and resources from organizing for 
social change to compliance and appeasing grantors;30 (3) their need 
for professional staff to raise funds and satisfy grantors ends up min-
imizing community control over their own struggles;31 and (4) their 
deep dependence on 501(c)(3) tax exemption for building their pro-
grams reflects complicity with federal policies that principally aim 
to benefit the wealthy and powerful, not low-income communities 
of color or other disenfranchised groups.32  
The activists launching these criticisms come out of different 
contexts, but they are generally connected by a set of three shared 
“anti-authoritarian”33 beliefs that have become influential political 
values among twenty-first century activists: (1) autonomy, a com-
mitment to freedom and democratic governance, and an opposition 
                                                                                                         
 28  Haber, supra note 25, at 316; Smith, supra note 26, at 9. 
 29  Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see generally Paul Kivel, Social Service or 
Social Change?, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at 
148. 
 30  Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Ruth Wilson Gilmore, In the Shadow of 
the Shadow State, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at 
47. 
 31  Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Christine E. Ahn, Democratizing Ameri-
can Philanthropy, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at 
66–68.  
 32  Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Dylan Rodriguez, The Political Logic of 
the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, 
supra note 26, at 37.  
 33  The term “anti-authoritarian” is only occasionally used by these activists 
themselves but is a useful label for describing a broad philosophical trend among 
social change activists. Haber, supra note 25, at 320. 
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to authoritarianism and hierarchy, including an opposition to extrac-
tive capitalism and authoritarian government power;34 (2) horizon-
talism, a commitment to opposing and overcoming the marginaliza-
tion of people of color, women, LGBTQ people, people with disa-
bilities, and other marginalized groups, and a belief that social struc-
tures, relationships, and communication must strive to be more in-
clusive, democratic, and horizontally organized;35 and (3) a belief 
that activism must be prefigurative, that the processes used in or-
ganizing and building a social movement and its infrastructure must 
already be constructing the world they want to see.36  
The turn of the twenty-first century has seen a flowering of in-
terest in new conceptual frameworks for social change activism 
                                                                                                         
 34  Id. at 322. Anti-authoritarian activists use the term autonomy to distinguish 
themselves from the government, corporations, and other institutions that are cen-
tralized and hierarchical; the term implies self-organization, direct democracy un-
mediated by representatives, and the principle that no person, group, or political 
party should mandate what another person must do. See GEORGY KATSIAFICAS, 
THE SUBVERSION OF POLITICS: EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
AND THE DECOLONIZATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE 6–7 (2006); MARINA SITRIN, In-
troduction to HORIZONTALISM: VOICES OF POPULAR POWER IN ARGENTINA 4 
(2006). 
 35  Haber, supra note 25, at 322–23. Anti-authoritarian activists believe that 
interpersonal relationships are affected by the power dynamics of hierarchy and 
that these power dynamics impact how people relate to one another in their eve-
ryday lives. See SITRIN, supra note 34, at 3–4. Horizontalism describes efforts to 
structure relationships, both interpersonal relationships and the relationships 
among members of an organization or social movement, in ways that fight against 
hierarchy so that people can work toward a truer solidarity. CHRIS DIXON, AN-
OTHER POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS TODAY’S TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENTS 
88–89 (2014).  
 36  Haber, supra note 25, at 323–24. “Unlike past [social] movements, social 
change is not deferred to a later date by demanding reforms from the state” until 
bigger changes can come when the time is finally right. SITRIN, supra note 34, at 
4. The goal is to change the world by making changes to ourselves and our ways 
of relating to each other, the slow creation of a culture of true democracy. See 
DAVID GRAEBER, THE DEMOCRACY PROJECT: A HISTORY, A CRISIS, A MOVE-
MENT 196 (2013). It is finding a way to “[c]hange the world without taking 
power.” See generally JOHN HOLLOWAY, CHANGE THE WORLD WITHOUT TAKING 
POWER 10 (2002). 
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springing out of a variety of theoretical, political, or practical per-
spectives influenced by these anti-authoritarian principles: the Oc-
cupy Movement and important parts of the Movement for Black 
Lives,37 the solidarity economy movement,38 “transformative” or-
ganizing models,39 activist efforts to protect and expand the com-
mons and the related rise in interest in the economist Elinor Ostrom, 
known for her analysis of the commons,40 and experiments with lib-
ertarian-socialist municipalism and confederalism.41  
                                                                                                         
 37  Haber, supra note 25, at 338–45, 352–59. 
 38  See Michelle Williams, The Solidarity Economy and Social Transfor-
mation, in THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY ALTERNATIVE: EMERGING THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 46, 43–51 (Vishwas Satgar ed., 2014) (distinguishing the “social econ-
omy,” non-profits, social enterprises, and cooperatives that “seek to achieve lim-
ited, progressive change within the confines of the current social order by amelio-
rating the effects of market failure, unemployment and poverty” from the “soli-
darity economy” that is defined by its “transformative vision of society based on 
democratic self-management, redistribution, solidarity and reciprocity”). 
 39  See STEVE WILLIAMS, DEMAND EVERYTHING: LESSONS OF THE TRANS-
FORMATIVE ORGANIZING MODEL 2 (Stefanie Ehmsen & Albert Scharenberg eds., 
2013), http://www.rosalux-nyc.org/wp-content/files_mf/williams_transformative 
_organizing.pdf (describing community organizing efforts that aim to foreground 
structural political problems and promote internal organizational democracy in-
stead of relying on transactional concessions on local issues). 
 40  See DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 
TO THE LIFE OF THE COMMONS 14 (2014) (stating that the revived commons move-
ment is important as “a practical paradigm for self-governance”); DEREK WALL, 
ELINOR OSTROM’S RULES FOR RADICALS: COOPERATIVE ALTERNATIVES BEYOND 
MARKETS AND STATES 15–16 (2017) (arguing that economist Elinor Ostrom, 
while not a political radical, “was unambiguously an advocate of deeper democ-
racy, ecological concern and social equality” and that her scholarship on the ef-
fective management of the commons “points to a practical politics that can focus 
our efforts to change society for the better”). 
 41  See generally KALI AKUNO & AJAMU NANGWAYA, Foreword to JACKSON 
RISING: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY AND BLACK SELF-DETERMI-
NATION IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, at xiii (2017) (describing the efforts of Cooper-
ation Jackson to develop grassroots municipalism in Jackson, Mississippi); JOHN 
MICHAEL COLÓN ET AL., COMMUNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND MUTUAL AID: TOWARD 
DUAL POWER AND BEYOND 2 (2017), https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/ 
2017-07/Symbiosis_AtLargeFirst-corrected-2.pdf (presenting a model for activ-
ism designed to encourage the development of participatory community institu-
tions); Alexander Kolokotronis, Is America Ready for a Municipalist Movement?, 
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These activists do not universally want or need tax exemption or 
non-profit corporate entities through which to conduct their work, 
but—informed by anti-authoritarian principles, inspired by the 
growth of the solidarity economy and commons movements, and at-
tuned to the critiques of the non-profit industrial complex—when 
their projects could benefit from incorporation or tax exemption, 
they have started to build organizations that reimagine the profes-
sionalized non-profit, creating corporate forms that pose conceptual 
shifts no less substantial than the mid-twentieth century shift away 
from the multipurpose, member-driven organizational model.  
The groups adopting these new non-profit corporate structures 
share the belief that professionalized non-profits fail to be as open, 
egalitarian, or cooperative as they should be, and that groups that 
aim to make the world a better place should care about operating in 
ways that are consistent with their visions for the world they want 
to see. These new organizations face the unique legal, practical, and 
philosophical challenges of seeking to remain true to their princi-
ples—often including their skepticism about non-profit corporate 
forms—while simultaneously navigating the issues facing any non-
profit start-up: how to define their work, how to structure their or-
ganizations, how to fund their programs, questions about tax exemp-
tion, and concerns about liability and risk. As they have started to 
navigate these challenges, these organizations have developed new 
models for non-profit structures and procedures, models that turn 
away from the professionalized non-profit, both looking back to the 
earlier tradition of multipurpose, membership-driven organizations 
and looking ahead to a more democratic and inclusive future.  
This Article describes four organizational structures for non-
profit organizations that depart radically from the professionalized 
non-profit framework. Part I describes non-profits embracing soci-
ocracy, first developed as a practical organizational form at a Dutch 
                                                                                                         
ROAR (Nov. 27, 2016), https://roarmag.org/essays/us-anti-fascism-municipalism/ 
(describing a model of collective self-governance based on the thinking of “com-
munalist” writer Murray Bookchin, in which directly democratic neighborhood 
assemblies provide local coalitions a measure of self-government and leverage 
their collective power in a federation).  
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engineering firm in the 1970s before coming to influence innovative 
businesses and non-profits around the world since the late 1990s. 
Part II analyzes worker self-directed non-profits, which developed 
out of the recent surge in interest in worker-owned cooperatives and 
the broader solidarity economy movement. Part III describes hub-
and-spoke or spokescouncil governance, which grew out of anti-au-
thoritarian political organizing models that become popular among 
activists in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Part IV describes non-
profit swarm organizations, a model largely influenced by the tech 
entrepreneur who founded the Swedish Pirate Party. Part V de-
scribes some of the primary legal concerns for groups adopting these 
new models, and Part VI concludes by proposing some best prac-
tices for activists and lawyers when considering these models.  
I. SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS 
Non-profits have been experimenting with sociocracy since the 
1990s, although the concept of sociocracy is not at all new. The term 
“sociocracy” was first used in the mid-nineteenth century by the 
French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte and then expanded on 
at the turn of the twentieth century by pioneering U.S. sociologist 
Lester Frank Ward; both used the term to refer to forms of self-gov-
ernance among groups of people who share social bonds.42 Decades 
                                                                                                         
 42  JOHN A. BUCK & GERARD ENDENBURG, THE CREATIVE FORCES OF SELF-
ORGANIZATION 3 (4th ed. 2012), http://thesociocracygroup.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/CreativeForces_9-2012_web.pdf; A Brief History, SOCIOCRACY 
3.0, https://sociocracy30.org/a-brief-history/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).  Comte 
described sociocracy as a perfect society not led by monarchs or the church, but 
by a central government of social scientists with the participation of all in a soci-
ety. See id. at 3–4. Ward was influenced by Comte’s social positivism, but, like 
Thomas Hobbes and Herbert Spencer, he understood the state through an analogy, 
as a living organism akin to an individual human. See LESTER FRANK WARD, THE 
PSYCHIC FACTORS OF CIVILIZATION 121–24 (1892) (describing and distinguishing 
his thinking from the work of Spencer and Comte). Ward argues that democratic 
states rely on a majoritarian fiction, the idea that the will of the people is somehow 
expressed by “the majority of qualified electors, no matter how small that majority 
may be” and believed that a sociocratic government could eliminate partisanship 
by having government always do “under the same circumstances just what an in-
telligent individual would do.” Id. at 327. 
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later, Kees Boeke, a Dutch polymath influenced by Comte and 
Ward, tried to implement their theories in an educational setting 
when he founded a private Quaker school called Werkplaats Kin-
dergemeenschap (the Children’s Community Workshop) in 1926.43 
Although influenced by the earlier theorists of sociocracy, Boeke’s 
model departs little from traditional Quaker practices of self-gov-
ernance, aiming for groups within his school to collectively and 
unanimously make decisions that would then bind all members of 
the group to honor and act in furtherance of those decisions.44 One 
of the young students at the school was Gerard Endenburg, who, 
decades later, would develop his childhood experience at Boeke’s 
school into the four principles that form the core of sociocratic or-
ganizations today.45 
Section I.A presents a brief history of Endenberg’s career and 
how he came to develop modern sociocracy at his engineering firm, 
and introduces the four principles of sociocracy that Endenburg de-
veloped as the core of sociocratic governance. With that back-
ground, Section I.B describes some of the varied ways that the soci-
ocratic model has been modified and experimented with by different 
non-profit organizations, and highlights how sociocracy has been 
implemented by one member-driven activist non-profit.  
                                                                                                         
 43  JOHN A. BUCK & SHARON VILLINES, WE THE PEOPLE: CONSENTING TO A 
DEEPER DEMOCRACY 34–36 (2007). The school was organized around Boeke’s 
interpretation of sociocratic principles and Quaker practices; it would become a 
hub of Dutch resistance to Nazi Germany, educating Jewish teenagers fleeing 
Germany and helping to smuggle Jews out of Nazi-occupied territory. Id. 
 44  Kees Boeke, Sociocracy: Democracy as It Might Be, in BUCK & VILLINES, 
supra note 43, at app. B at 191, 193 (2007); see BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, 
at 36–38 (describing the influence of Quaker practices on his school). In Boeke’s 
framing of sociocracy, there were three core rules for decision-making: (1) the 
interests of all members must be considered, with individual members deferring 
to the interests of the group; (2) decisions must be ones that all members can ac-
cept, or else no action can be taken; and (3) all members must be ready to act in 
furtherance of a decision when unanimously made. Id. 
 45  See BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 39–47. 
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A. Gerard Endenburg and the Development of the  
Four Principles of Sociocracy 
Endenburg was the son of Dutch pacifists who founded a suc-
cessful Rotterdam-based engineering firm, Endenburg Electrotech-
niek B.V. (“Endenburg Electric”).46 After attending Boeke’s school, 
going to college, and serving in the military, Endenburg worked as 
an engineer at Philips Electronics, where he was far more focused 
on technology and the applied sciences than pacifism, Quakerism, 
or the theories of Comte and Ward.47 But when his parents invited 
him to become the new general manager of Endenburg Electric in 
the late 1960s, Endenburg began an intensive, systematic analysis 
of management techniques, bringing his interests in cybernetics, 
systems thinking, and game theory to understanding firm manage-
ment.48 He chose to cap the company’s growth in order to turn at-
tention away from profit-maximization and toward innovation, pro-
moting entrepreneurialism among the workers, and experimenting 
with business structures.49 He considered turning Endenburg Elec-
tric into a worker-owned cooperative, but felt that cooperatives were 
inherently bound to struggle with management and capitalization, so 
he instead developed an employee compensation and profit-distri-
bution structure that involved both fixed and variable compensation 
for the company’s workers, managers, and investors,  a model that 
aimed to weaken the power of outside investors50 while encouraging 
workers to be entrepreneurial and take responsibility for the success 
of the business.51  
                                                                                                         
 46  JACK QUARTER, BEYOND THE BOTTOM LINE: SOCIALLY INNOVATIVE BUSI-
NESS OWNERS 54 (2000). 
 47  BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 38. 
 48  Id. at 40–41. 
 49  A. Georges L. Romme, Domination, Self-Determination and Circular Or-
ganizing, 20 ORG. STUD. 801, 810 (1999). 
 50  Id. at 815–16. 
 51  BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 41–42. After more than a decade lead-
ing Endenburg Electric, Endenburg ultimately transferred his ownership stake in 
the company to a holding company to be purchased by the company’s workers 
over a ten-year period, and became the director of an organization called Socioc-
880 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:863 
Most influentially,52 Endenburg sought to promote more demo-
cratic group decision-making within the firm through what he called 
                                                                                                         
ratisch Centrum (Sociocratic Center), which promotes the sociocratic model in-
ternationally. QUARTER, supra note 46, at 55–56. Notably, one reason for his de-
parture was his frustration with Endenberg Electric’s unionized labor force, which 
he felt harmed the entrepreneurial spirit of the company’s workers, and he sought 
to make all of the workers into owners in part to change this dynamic. Id. at 55.  
 52  Beyond the dozens of businesses and non-profits that have adopted socio-
cratic principles, Endenburg’s model would be a major influence on more popular 
management trends, and the four principles form the backbone of some of the 
most widely discussed trends in management theory of the 2010s, including Teal 
Organizations and Holacracy. Teal Organizations aim to have their business struc-
tures operate like ecosystems, based on the principles of: (1) self-management 
rather than top-down hierarchy or consensus; (2) personal wholeness of workers, 
inviting workers to not come to the workplace with only a narrow “professional” 
self but also to remain in touch with their emotional and intuitive selves; and (3) 
evolutionary purpose, recognizing that the group entity has a direction of its own 
that it wants to serve. FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A 
GUIDE TO CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN 
CONSCIOUSNESS 55–57 (2014). Teal Organizations also developed the idea of the 
“advice process,” an influential variation on Consent processes. The idea is that 
for certain kinds of decisions, a person can make a decision on his or her own, but 
only after seeking advice from both people who will be meaningfully affected by 
the decision and from people with expertise in the matter; advice must be sought, 
but it is up to the decision-maker whether or not to modify her approach based on 
that advice. See Decision Making, REINVENTING ORG. WIKI, http://www.reinvent-
ingorganizationswiki.com/Decision_Making (last visited Feb. 1, 2019); Rebel-
lious Practices: Make Better Decisions with the Advice Process, CORP. REBELS 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://corporate-rebels.com/advice-process/. 
Holacracy has received significant attention from the business press and has 
been implemented by Zappos.com and, for a period of time, the online publishing 
platform Medium. See, e.g., Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the Holacracy Hype, 
HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2016, at 38, 40, https://hbr.org/2016/ 07/beyond-
the-holacracy-hype; Andy Doyle, Management and Organization at Medium, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 4, 2016), https://blog.medium.com/management-and-organiza-
tion-at-medium-2228cc9d93e9; Adam Pisoni, Here’s Why You Should Care 
About Holacracy, FIRST ROUND REV., https://firstround.com/review/heres-why-
you-should-care-about-holacracy (last visited Feb. 25, 2019); Marcus Wohlsen, 
The Next Big Thing You Missed: Companies That Work Better Without Bosses, 
WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/01/holacracy-at-zappos. Ho-
lacracy has proven influential with certain high-tech firms, as it aims to mirror the 
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the “four principles” of sociocracy: (1) policy decisions are made by 
Consent, “the absence of any ‘reasoned objections’” to a proposal 
by members of a decision-making group; (2) Consent decisions are 
made largely in self-managed, semi-autonomous groups called Cir-
cles; (3) while the decision-making process within a Circle aims to 
be egalitarian, the Circles themselves are in a hierarchical relation-
ship with one another, connected up and down the hierarchy through 
“double links,” representatives from lower and higher Circles who 
participate in the Circle; and (4) people within a Circle are selected 
for specific functions and tasks by the Consent of the members of 
the Circle after an open discussion.53  
1. CONSENT 
Influenced by his experience at Boeke’s school, but recognizing 
that obtaining unanimous consensus54 in large groups can be nearly 
                                                                                                         
flexibility of the trend toward Agile software development through bringing to-
gether elements of Agile development and sociocracy, including sociocracy’s hi-
erarchy of Circles and double-linking between those Circles. Pepijn van de Kamp, 
Holacracy–A Radical Approach to Organizational Design, in ELEMENTS OF THE 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS—INFLUENCES ON PROJECT SUCCESS AND 
FAILURE 13, 19–20 (2014). See generally BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: 
THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 3, 12–13 
(2015); Holacracy Constitution, HOLACRACY (June 2015), http://www.ho-
lacracy.org/constitution.  
Less popular than Teal Organizations and holacracy is another management 
model called Sociocracy 3.0, which expands Endenburg’s four principles into a 
new list of seven principles: (1) effectiveness (devoting time only to your objec-
tives); (2) consent (asking for and resolving any objections before approving de-
cisions); (3) empiricism (“test[ing] all assumptions through experimentation”); 
(4) continuous improvement (“chang[ing] incrementally to accommodate steady 
empirical learning”); (5) equivalence (allowing people affected by decisions to 
influence and change them); (6) transparency (making information available to all 
in the organization absent reasons for confidentiality); and (7) accountability (re-
sponding and taking ownership for the course of the organization as a whole). 
BRIAN BOCKELBRING ET AL., SOCIOCRACY 3.0 – A PRACTICAL GUIDE 20–21 
(2019) http://sociocracy30.org/_res/s3-all-patterns-explained.pdf. 
 53  QUARTER, supra note 46, at 53–54; BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 
44–46. 
 54  Romme, supra note 49, at 810 (stating that  Endenburg believed “consen-
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impossible, Endenburg developed a process for collaborative deci-
sion-making based on what he saw as a technical or quasi-scientific 
idea of “Consent.”55 For Boeke, the pacifist Quaker, once members 
of a group have trust and respect for one another, decisions can be 
made peacefully and with unanimity; in contrast, Endenburg’s idea 
of Consent looked at decision-making in his business as machine-
like—rather than grounding decision-making on mutual trust and 
respect, the firm-as-machine needs only to have all parts working 
well enough that the machine does not break down.56 Where the 
Quaker consensus model requires all participants to affirmatively 
agree in order to take group action, Endenburg’s Consent process 
simply requires that no participant give a “reasoned objection” to a 
proposal.57 The process is meant to foster a dialogue in which the 
participants attempt to arrive at a position all can accept, rather than 
forcing those who would lose a majority vote to acquiesce to a po-
sition they find intolerable.58 In Endenburg’s model, sociocratic or-
ganizations do not need to go through a Consent process for routine 
decisions, but there must be Consent for decisions on larger policy 
issues.59 
The Consent process follows a series of formal steps. First, a 
person or group will generate a proposal, typically in a written draft 
prepared and circulated for comment prior to the meeting at which 
it is to be discussed. At that meeting, the group goes through four 
steps: (1) presentation of the proposal; (2) a clarifying round, in 
which only clarifying questions are asked about the proposal; (3) a 
                                                                                                         
sus” meant the Quaker principle of “full agreement to consent,” or the total “ab-
sence of any argued objection”). The division between consensus and Consent 
articulated by Endenburg is no longer such a clear distinction. Many activist 
groups today use the term consensus to mean something close to what Endenburg 
calls Consent. See Haber, supra note 25, at 334 (describing the consensus process 
used in the Occupy Wall Street movement, in which consensus was supposed to 
be blocked only in the rare situation where a participant had a serious moral, eth-
ical, or safety concern about a proposal). 
 55  BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 42–43. 
 56  See id. at 43; QUARTER, supra note 46, at 57. 
 57  BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6; Romme, supra note 49, at 810.  
 58  QUARTER, supra note 46, at 57; Romme, supra note 49, at 811. 
 59  BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6. 
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quick reaction round, in which quick feedback is solicited about the 
proposal, and adjustments made based on these reactions if all agree; 
and (4) the Consent process, in which all members of the group are 
asked if they have any reasoned objections and, if so, listing them in 
writing and then seeking to resolve each one through dialogue and 
amendments to the proposal, or else rejecting the proposal.60 
2. CIRCLES 
Endenburg also moved away from a conventional governance 
and management structure to spread authority to a broader range of 
workers through the use of “Circles,” decision-making bodies for 
people from different job functions and levels of seniority to make 
joint policy decisions in their areas of responsibility.61 Although Cir-
cles are democratic forums when making decisions on the matters 
before them, in the sociocratic model, the Circles themselves are set 
in a hierarchy.62  
 
                                                                                                         
 60  Id. at 9. 
 61  BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 43. The term “Circle” is an imperfect 
translation of the Dutch word kring, which literally translates as “ring” or “circle,” 
but which also has the connotation of the English word “arena”—a place where 
meaningful events happen. Id. at 43–44. The term Circle has, in the years since 
Endenburg developed his model, become quite popular among groups ranging 
from discussion circles to businesses that are interested in collaborative decision-
making, and today is commonly associated with group-process tools like World 
Café, Open Space, and the Art of Hosting. See The Many Faces of Circles, CTR. 
FOR DYNAMIC COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE: BLOG, http://www.dynamic-govern-
ance.org/the-many-faces-of-Circles (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). Although some 
in the “circle movement” appear to be influenced by sociocracy, many writers, 
including leading voices within the “circle movement” such as Christina Baldwin 
and Ann Linnea, trace the concept to ancient indigenous practices, not 1970s man-
agement innovations. See CHRISTINA BALDWIN & ANN LINNEA, THE CIRCLE 
WAY: A LEADER IN EVERY CHAIR 4–10 (2010) (describing the circle as an im-
portant symbol of, and archetype for, group processes since the Late Paleolithic 
era or earlier). 
 62  QUARTER, supra note 46, at 58. 
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Figure 1. A basic organizational chart of a sociocratic firm showing  
double-links between Circles 
 
At Endenburg Electric, the lowest-level Department Circles 
ranged in size from six to twenty-five people, with each Circle 
tasked with setting policy for a particular area of the business, like 
manufacturing, electronics, personnel, or accounting.63 Every em-
ployee of the company belonged to at least one of these Department 
Circles.64 The middle-level General Circle is made up of around 
twenty-five people and formulates policy for the entire company; it 
is comprised of senior management, department heads, and repre-
sentatives selected by each Department Circle to represent their in-
terests in the General Circle.65 The highest-level Circle operates 
somewhat like an independent corporate Board of Directors; it is 
comprised of four people, neither employees nor owners, who have 
experience in fields like finance, law, and government.66 Along with 
                                                                                                         
 63  Id. 
 64  Romme, supra note 49, at 808. 
 65  QUARTER, supra note 46, at 58–59. 
 66  Id. at 59. 
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representatives from the General Circle, this Board Circle oversees 
the organization, plans for its future, and manages corporate 
shares.67 
Circle meetings typically follow the following steps: (1) an 
opening round, a time to “attune” and get settled; (2) administrative 
concerns, including announcements, times for upcoming meetings, 
Consent approval of minutes of the prior meeting, and acceptance 
or amendment of the planned agenda; (3) a discussion of all agenda 
items using the Consent process; and (4) a closing round, a time to 
reflect on the meeting and discuss how it could have been better or 
more efficient, and to discuss potential matters for future meetings.68 
3. DOUBLE-LINKING 
As part of this Circle structure, Endenburg created the concept 
of “double-linking,” the idea that rather than having a manager as 
the sole, top-down link from organizational leadership to the work-
ers, each Circle has two links: the Operations Leader of the Circle is 
a manager or supervisor, selected by the higher Circle to lead the 
next-lower Circle, but the lower Circle also selects one of its mem-
bers to act as a Representative of its members, bringing their per-
spectives to the next-higher Circle.69 Endenburg’s Circles were 
capped at twenty-five people in order to encourage meaningful par-
ticipation within each Circle, and relied on these double-links for 
communication between the different Circles.70  
4. SELECTION BY CONSENT 
Endenburg’s fourth principle flows out of the first three: each 
Circle uses a Consent process to select people to lead on particular 
tasks, to serve as Representatives to the next-higher Circle, and 
sometimes for the selection of workers for managerial positions.71 
                                                                                                         
 67  Id. 
 68  BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 7. 
 69  Id. at 6; BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 44; Romme, supra note 49, at 
808. 
 70  QUARTER, supra note 46, at 59. 
 71  BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 41–46; QUARTER, supra note 46, at 
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Sociocratic organizations conduct these elections by Consent as fol-
lows: (1) the relevant Circle first reviews the role, describing the 
position and its responsibilities; (2) it then has a nomination process, 
with each member of the Circle asked to nominate a person in writ-
ing; (3) the Circle then has an explanations round, with each mem-
ber of the Circle explaining the reasons for their proposals; (4) there 
is a change round, in which the facilitator asks all Circle members 
if they want to change their nomination based on the arguments 
heard in the prior round; and, finally, (5) the Circle has a Consent 
round, in which the facilitator proposes the nominee with what he 
or she believes are the strongest arguments in support of him or her 
and asks each person, including the proposed nominee, if he or she 
has any reasoned objection to the proposed nomination.72 
B. Sociocracy in Non-Profit Organizations 
Today, sociocratic governance is used internationally by manu-
facturing and technology firms, local government agencies, and by 
a variety of non-profit organizations.73 This Section will describe 
how non-profits have implemented sociocracy, focusing on the fol-
lowing considerations: (1) how non-profits use Circles; (2) the role 
of the Board of Directors and corporate officers in sociocratic non-
profits; (3) the role of non-profit members, volunteers, and other 
stakeholders in sociocratic non-profits; and, finally, (4) an analysis 
of one activist group that has developed a member-driven socio-
cratic non-profit structure.  
1. THE USE OF CIRCLES IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS 
At the core of the sociocratic corporate structure is the hierarchy 
of double-linked Circles.74 An analysis of a widely-used template 
for non-profit sociocratic corporate by-laws shows the hierarchy of 
                                                                                                         
62 (noting that in some cases mangers are selected through this process, but in 
others, managers are selected by the next-higher Circle). 
 72  BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 7–8. 
 73  See Sociocracy Today, SOCIOCRACY, http://www.sociocracy.info/about-
sociocracy/sociocracy-today/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  
 74  BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6. 
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Circles in a non-profit sociocratic organization to function similarly 
to the hierarchy of Circles in any sociocratic entity: the Board Circle 
is made up of the Board of Directors and a Representative from the 
General Circle; the General Circle is made up of the Executive Di-
rector or Chief Executive Officer and other organizational leaders, 
an Operations Leader chosen by the Board of Directors, and Repre-
sentatives to the Circle chosen by lower Department Circles; and the 
Department Circles are comprised of staff within one program area, 
along with an Operations Leader chosen by the General Circle.75 In 
cases where there is a hierarchy among Department Circles, a lower 
Department Circle has an Operations Leader chosen by the higher 
Department Circle, and the lower Department Circle selects a Rep-
resentative to the higher Department Circle.76 
Although this model does not completely eliminate organiza-
tional hierarchy, the Circle model and Consent process may allow 
staff within each Circle to have more autonomy and control over 
their work than in conventional non-profit structures. While a Circle 
must stay within the limits imposed on it by the next-higher Circle, 
it has the freedom to select and execute its own projects and develop 
policies in furtherance of the purposes set by that higher Circle.77 
Sociocratic non-profits may grant Department Circles autonomy to 
determine how they will staff, execute, and evaluate their own pro-
jects.78 Department Circles also may establish their own procedures 
for certain administrative and managerial responsibilities, including: 
setting Circle-level recordkeeping policies; providing professional 
development opportunities for members; selecting Representatives 
to the next-higher Circle; developing a budget and choosing how to 
spend funds allocated to the Circle; creating lower Circles as it 
deems appropriate; selecting the Operations Leader of the next-
                                                                                                         
 75  See John Buck & Sharon Villines, Bylaws for a Sociocratic Organization, 
SOCIOCRACY, http://www.sociocracy.info/bylaws-for-a-sociocratic-organization/ 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Buck & Villines, Bylaws]. This form for 
sociocratic non-profit by-laws was originally written for a membership non-profit 
incorporated in Washington, D.C. Id.  
 76  Id. art. 3. 
 77  Id. art. 4. 
 78  Id. 
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lower Circle; and deciding whether lower Circles should be subdi-
vided, combined, or dissolved.79 
Circles do not have complete autonomy, however. Sociocratic 
non-profits balance Circle autonomy with rules designed to ensure 
accountability to the overall organization and to promote efficient 
work processes and decision-making. The system of double-links, 
for instance, encourages the accountability of the Circle to the or-
ganization by requiring each Circle to give oversight to the next-
lower Circle and to report its operations to the next-higher Circle.80 
Sociocratic non-profits also impose recordkeeping rules designed to 
promote accountability, requiring that Circles keep substantial notes 
in a logbook that documents budgets, policy decisions, and meeting 
notes, as well as the individual Circle members’ aims, roles, respon-
sibilities, and development plans.81 Finally, sociocratic non-profits 
may establish a back-up process that can be triggered if a Circle pro-
cess fails to produce Consent on a critical issue.82 
2. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE  
OFFICERS IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS 
The Board of Directors of a sociocratic non-profit is, of course, 
ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable 
corporate, tax, regulatory, and contractual responsibilities, and soci-
ocratic Board Circles usually approach those responsibilities simi-
larly to the Boards of professionalized non-profits.83 The Board Cir-
cle of a sociocratic non-profit may be responsible for setting and 
                                                                                                         
 79  Id. The only decisions exempted from a regular Circle governance process 
are decisions regarding Circle elimination or redefinition, when the Operations 
Leader and Representatives of the lower Circle may participate in the discussion 
but are not part of the Consent process, and personnel decisions, when a member 
who is the subject of the decision may participate in the decision-making but may 
not participate in granting or blocking Consent to those decisions. Id. § 4.2. 
 80  Id. § 4.3. In addition to the Operations Leader, Circles generally select a 
facilitator to lead all Circle meetings, who may be asked to ensure that the Circle 
is complying with its mission and functioning in accordance with sociocratic prin-
ciples. Id. art. 4. 
 81  Id.  
 82  Id. § 5.7.  
 83  Id. §§ 6.1, 6.2. 
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overseeing the execution of a strategic plan; ensuring fiscal respon-
sibility and long-term viability; generating new ideas and directions; 
and maintaining connections with external persons, organizations, 
agencies, and any other necessary bodies.84  
The Board Circle of a sociocratic non-profit typically consists of 
the following positions: the Executive Director, Chief Executive Of-
ficer, or similar staff leader; Representatives from the General Cir-
cle; and three or more “expert” directors, usually selected for their 
experience with sociocratic governance or their legal, operations, 
fundraising, or accounting expertise.85 Like other non-profit direc-
tors, the directors of a sociocratic non-profit are treated as fiduciar-
ies, may be indemnified for acts conducted in good faith and in pur-
suit of work duly approved by the organization, and are typically 
uncompensated for their work as directors.86 Directors are selected 
through a Consent election.87 Sociocratic non-profits do not allow 
Board Circles to dissolve their organizations without the approval 
of their other Circles, and sociocratic non-profit Boards Circles use 
the Consent process rather than a majority or super-majority vote to 
make decisions.88 Like other Circles, when a Board Circle fails to 
obtain Consent, it may foresake internal democracy and refer the 
matter to a single director with expertise in the relevant subject area 
and agree to follow his or her judgement.89  
Corporate officers in sociocratic non-profits are chosen by a 
Consent election and usually mirror conventional non-profit corpo-
rate officers. Officers may include a President responsible for over-
seeing staff, monitoring compliance with internal and external rules, 
and speaking for the organization, a Treasurer responsible for over-
sight of the organization’s finances, and a Secretary responsible for 
                                                                                                         
 84  Id. § 6.2. 
 85  Id. §§ 6.3, 6.5. 
 86  Id. §§ 6.6, 6.7, art. 13. 
 87  Id. art. 7. For a description of the Consent election process, see supra note 
72 and accompanying text. 
 88  Buck & Villines, Bylaws, supra note 75, § 5.6. 
 89  Id. 
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taking minutes at meetings and keeping accurate corporate rec-
ords.90  
3. ROLES FOR VOLUNTEERS, MEMBERS, AND OTHER  
STAKEHOLDERS IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS 
Sociocratic non-profits generally aim to be more inclusive of 
volunteers in their governance processes than professionalized non-
profits do.91 Volunteers may be brought into corporate governance 
through a Volunteer Circle double-linked to the Board Circle or 
General Circle, or they may be distributed by function or department 
across a variety of Department Circles.92  
 
 
Figure 2. A sociocratic non-profit with members, advisory board, and  
funders Circles93 
                                                                                                         
 90  Id. § 6.4. 
 91  JOHN A. BUCK & JERRY KOCH-GONZALEZ, DYNAMIC GOVERNANCE FOR 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2014), http://sociocracyconsulting.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/04/DG-for-Nonprofits-v1-11-14.pdf. 
 92  Id. 
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Sociocratic non-profits may take other stakeholders into their 
governance structures as well: people who receive direct organiza-
tional services, like students in a school or homeless families in a 
shelter; those who indirectly receive the benefits of those direct ser-
vices, like the parents of students in a school; and sometimes even 
donors or grantors who contribute funds to an organization may be 
included in its governance structure.94 A sociocratic non-profit may 
put all of these stakeholders into one “Client’s Circle,” or may put 
them in different Circles based on their roles and connections to the 
organization.95  
The sociocratic model can be used quite differently in different 
contexts. Some sociocratic non-profits, consistent with the profes-
sionalized non-profit model, have no members, or have members 
with very limited rights, and use Endenburg’s model to democratize 
governance and decision-making only among Board and staff.96 But 
other sociocratic non-profits use sociocracy as a mechanism for 
structuring and sharing decision-making powers with members. 
Some groups offer members a limited voice in organizational mat-
ters by double-linking a Circle of members and other stakeholders 
to the Board, giving members a voice at the Board level and allow-
ing the Board to convey information to members, but not allowing 
members much functional control over the Board or staff.97 
Other groups use the four principles of sociocracy to more fully 
integrate members into organizational governance and decision-
making. Sociocracy has been particularly popular with non-profit 
intentional communities98 like ecovillages, student cooperatives, co-
housing groups, monasteries, ashrams, and communes, groups of 
                                                                                                         
 94  Id. at 3. 
 95  Id. 
 96  See, e.g., Buck & Villines, Bylaws, supra note 75, art. 9 (establishing that 
members fo the organization do not have voting rights); see also BUCK & ENDEN-
BURG, supra note 42, at 5. 
 97  See BUCK & KOCH-GONZALEZ, supra note 91, at 4–6. 
 98  See Diana Leafe Christian, Transparency, Equivalence, and Effectiveness: 
How Sociocracy Can Help Communities, Part I, 160 COMMUNITIES 59, 63 (2013) 
(listing eleven intentional communities using sociocracy across North America 
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people who have chosen “to live together with a common purpose, 
working cooperatively to create a lifestyle that reflects their shared 
values.”99 Many of these groups are philosophically inclined toward 
democratic, non-hierarchical decision-making and had previously 
relied on inefficient unanimous consensus rules, so the Consent pro-
cess spread quickly among these groups between the 1990s and 
2010s, even as these groups sometimes sought to modify other ele-
ments of the sociocratic structure to grant more rights to members, 
make sociocratic processes more efficient for groups of different 
sizes, or make members’ experiences of sociocratic processes feel 
less hiearchical.100  
4. THE MULTIPURPOSE, MEMBER-DRIVEN  
SOCIOCRATIC ACTIVIST NON-PROFIT 
Influenced by these non-profit sociocratic models, the North 
Bay (California) Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America 
                                                                                                         
and Europe). 
 99  Intentional Communities, FELLOWSHIP FOR INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY 
http://www.ic.org/wiki/intentional-communities/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019). 
 100  See, e.g., Anamaria Aristizabal, Sociocracy to the Rescue at Aldeafeliz 
Ecovillage: How Sociocracy Can Help Communities, Part V, 166 COMMUNITIES 
55 (2015) (describing how an ecovillage “made the methodology our own, not 
always following the Sociocratic method to the letter”); Diana Leafe Christian, 
Consensus and the Burden of Added Process: Are There Easier Ways to Make 
Decisions?, Part I, 158 COMMUNITIES 56, 58 (2013) (describing frustrations with 
the Consent process and rising interest in newer methods, including “Sociocracy, 
Holacracy, and the N Street Consensus Method”); Diana Leafe Christian, Self-
Governance with Circles and Double Links: How Sociocracy Can Help Commu-
nities, Part II, 161 COMMUNITIES 61–64 (2013) [hereinafter Christian, Self-Gov-
ernance with Circles and Double Links] (describing changes from the original 
Endenburg model, including changing the concept of Circles that are higher or 
lower in hierarchy to Circles that are “larger,” more abstract or long-term and 
“smaller,” more concrete or focused on short-term goals); Tena Meadows O’Rear 
& John Buck, Going Dutch: Sociocracy at EcoVillage of Loudoun County, 109 
COMMUNITIES 38, 39 (2000) (describing how the frustration and inefficiency of 
consensus governance of an ecovillage was greatly improved after changing to 
sociocracy). Despite the relatively widespread interest in sociocracy within inten-
tional communities, most such groups still groups use other decision-making pro-
cesses. Christian, Self-Governance with Circles and Double Links, supra, at 61. 
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(“North Bay DSA”) selected a sociocratic non-profit model to struc-
ture its membership non-profit that focuses on politicized commu-
nity- and member-organizing.101 This model looks to a degree like 
other sociocratic non-profits, but by transforming the sociocratic 
structure from a system for empowering employees within an organ-
ization’s governance to a model for organizing a membership-led, 
activist group, the sociocratic structure becomes significantly more 
aligned with the anti-authoritarian principles of autonomy, horizon-
talism, and prefigurative politics,102 which North Bay DSA ex-
pressly aims to do.103 
Like other sociocratic non-profits, the North Bay DSA generally 
follows the four sociocratic principles, and its decision-making is 
                                                                                                         
 101  See Bylaws for the Democratic Socialists of America, North Bay Chapter, 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM., at art. IV (Oct. 2017), https://www.dsa 
northbay.org/s/DSA-North-Bay-Bylaws.pdf [hereinafter North Bay Bylaws]. The 
Democratic Socialists of America (“DSA”) is a national organization of socialists 
that, following the 2016 presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders, grew 
to become the largest socialist organization since the 1950s, claiming more than 
50,000 members by 2018. See Alexi McCammond, By the Numbers: Democratic 
Socialist Victories in the 2018 Midterms, AXIOS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.ax-
ios.com/democratic-socialist-candidates-who-have-won-in-2018-midterms-6bf 
604a3-ee98-4ab3-9e63-349aec324c43.html (discussing 50,000 members as of 
2018); Joseph M. Schwartz, A History of Democratic Socialists of America 1971-
2017, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM. (July 2017), https://www.dsausa.org/about-
us/history/. The national DSA has fairly few staff and a delegate-elected Board. 
Leadership and Structure, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM., https://www.ds 
ausa.org/about-us/structure/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). As of early 2019, the 
DSA had 189 state and local chapters. See Chapters, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 
AM., https://www.dsausa.org/chapters/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). The structure 
of the North Bay DSA is considerably different from the structure described in 
the model bylaws for local chapters that were promulgated by the Steering Com-
mittee of the DSA’s National Political Committee, which look much more like 
conventional professionalized non-profit bylaws with most organizational power 
concentrated in a centralized Board of Directors elected by membership. This 
model was criticized by many DSA members for both procedural and substantive 
reasons. DSA Accountability, Proposal for Sample Chapter Bylaws, MEDIUM 
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@dsa.acctability/proposal-for-sample-
chapter-bylaws-83124652978e.  
 102  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 103  See North Bay Bylaws, supra note 101, art. II. 
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done by Consent.104 North Bay DSA’s lowest-level Departmental 
Circles include all people who have a “significant role” in particular 
projects, and the group allows each Circle to self-define who meets 
that standard.105 Disputes over such decisions are referred to a mem-
ber-selected Conflict Resolution Circle, which serves as a neutral 
arbiter in the event of internal conflicts.106  
 
Figure 3. A sociocratic non-profit with a General Assembly of all members 
as its Top Circle107 
 
North Bay DSA’s middle-level Circle is its Coordination Circle, 
which manages the operations of the group within the limits set by 
the Top Circle, but its Top Circle, rather than consisting of a con-
ventional Board of Directors, is a General Assembly made up of all 
                                                                                                         
 104  Id. art. IV, § 3; art. VII, § 2. Circles may choose, by Consent, to use another 
method of decision-making. Id. art. VII, § 2.  
 105  Id. art. V, § 4(a).  
 106  Id. art. V, § 10.  
 107  With all members in the Top Circle, that Circle graphically comes to en-
velop the other Circles, as substantially all of the Coordination Circle and Depart-
mental Circles are comprised of members of the General Assembly. See id. art. 
V.  
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members of the chapter in good standing.108 By elevating its mem-
bership to this Top Circle, the North Bay DSA is making clear that 
its membership holds the ultimate power in the organization, and 
that the Coordination Circle, which manages certain operational 
tasks that might typically be reserved for a non-profit Board, an-
swers to the membership.109 Officer duties, similarly, are largely 
within the control of the General Assembly, which elects a treasurer 
to manage organizational finances, as well as between one to three 
secretaries to do much of the coordination of meetings of the Gen-
eral Assembly.110 
These Circles are all double-linked together, with autonomy for 
each Circle to choose how it will pursue the goals set for it by the 
next-higher Circle.111 The Circles self-select their Circle-level offic-
ers, which include: a Leader, who is tasked with ensuring that the 
work of the Circle is done in a timely way; a Facilitator, who facili-
tates Circle meetings; a Secretary, who coordinates minutes and 
meeting announcements; a Logbook Keeper, who maintains a log-
book detailing the activities of the Circle; and a Representative, who 
participates in the next-higher Circle.112  
North Bay DSA explains that it developed this adaptation of the 
sociocratic non-profit model in order to build a socialist organiza-
tion that aligns closely with the three anti-authoritarian principles: 
autonomy and self-governance, which it argues its sociocratic model 
promotes among members;113 horizontalism and the commitment to 
                                                                                                         
 108  Id. art. V, §§ 5, 9. The concept of the General Assembly is associated with 
anti-authoritarian activism and implies that all can participate, speak, and make 
proposals as full participants in a meeting. Haber, supra note 25, at 334. General 
Assemblies often do not function as a decision-making body that takes large group 
votes, but rather as a forum that hears the perspectives of members of the group 
and then allows “individuals and subgroups . . . [to] act autonomously, respecting 
the assembly while sparing it the burden of micromanagement.” NATHAN SCHNEI-
DER, THANK YOU, ANARCHY: NOTES FROM THE OCCUPY APOCALYPSE 19 (2013). 
 109  See North Bay Bylaws, supra note 101, art. V, § 9. 
 110  Id. art. VIII, § 3.  
 111  Id. art. IV, § 3; art. VI, § 1.  
 112  Id. art. VI, § 3.  
 113  Id. art. IV, § 2(b) (listing among the purposes of its sociocratic governance 
model “self-governance, self-organization, and cooperation”). 
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equality, intersectionality, and opposition to the marginalization of 
all who have been marginalized in society, which it presents as at 
the very core of both its vision of socialism and its organizational 
structure;114 and prefigurativism, contending that their version of so-
ciocracy is itself already helping to build the world they want to see, 
“prefigure[ing] a more radically egalitarian socialist future.”115  
II. WORKER SELF-DIRECTED NON-PROFITS 
The concept of the worker self-directed non-profit was devel-
oped by the Oakland-based non-profit law firm Sustainable Econo-
mies Law Center (“SELC”),116 echoing economist Richard Wolff’s 
term “Worker Self-Directed Enterprises” (“WSDEs”), meaning 
businesses in which workers are the lead decision-makers for their 
enterprises.117 The idea of the WSDE might sometimes be confused 
with that of the worker-owned cooperative, but the two are distinct. 
The worker-owned cooperative is defined by worker ownership of 
the firm, from which a more egalitarian management of the firm 
flows: “the ownership of capital by labor and labor’s resulting man-
agement of capital.”118 Conversely, the idea of the WSDE is funda-
mentally about governance of the firm: 
[It is] not primarily a matter of workers as owners of 
these enterprises (fine, but not required), nor primar-
ily as managers (likewise fine, but not required). It is 
                                                                                                         
 114  Id. art. II, § 1 (asserting that “our socialism must be intersectional in na-
ture. . . . We are committed to fighting transphobia, racism, homophobia, ableism, 
and imperialism, both in the world and in our own ranks”). 
 115  Id. art. IV, § 2.  
 116  See Sustainable Economies Law Center, Webinar on Worker Self Directed 
Nonprofits: Workplace Democracy in Nonprofit Organizations, YOUTUBE (June 
2, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uU1w9uXGGLY [hereinafter 
SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits] (discussing the SELC’s 
adoption of its worker self-directed nonprofit model at 17:54–18:01).  
 117  See RICHARD WOLFF, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: A CURE FOR CAPITALISM 
117 (2012). 
 118  FRANK T. ADAMS & GARY B. HANSEN, PUTTING DEMOCRACY TO WORK: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STARTING AND MANAGING WORKER-OWNED BUSI-
NESSES 1 (2d. ed. 1992). 
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the tasks of direction—the decision making now as-
signed usually and primarily to corporate boards of 
directors and only secondarily to the major share-
holders who choose them—that must be transferred 
to the workers collectively.119  
With this distinction in mind, the sometimes-discussed idea of a 
“non-profit worker co-op” is muddled, as Boards of Directors of 
most tax-exempt non-profits are barred from distributing non-profit 
corporate revenues to their directors, staff, or others, outside of rea-
sonable compensation for work performed.120 On the other hand, the 
concept of a non-profit WSDE could describe any non-profit in 
which staff set the general direction for the organization with little 
guidance from the Board. While the name may imply a broader con-
cept, the model of the worker self-directed non-profit developed by 
SELC is unique, inspired by the principles of the commons move-
ment121 and parts of the sociocratic governance model.122 Although 
                                                                                                         
 119  RICHARD D. WOLFF, NEXT SYS. PROJECT, START WITH WORKER SELF-DI-
RECTED ENTERPRISES (2016), https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/2017-
08/RickWolff.pdf. 
 120  Prohibitions on private inurement are found in section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (11), (13), (19) (2012). A 
similar prohibition is applied to section 501(c)(5) organizations by regulation. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1. 
 121  See Janelle Orsi, Three Legal Principles for Organizations Rebuilding the 
Commons, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND 
DEMOCRATIC 119, 120–23  (Melissa K. Scanlan ed. 2017) (describing the princi-
ples for developing the organizational structure of SELC as grounded in the com-
mons movement). Orsi argues that the worker self-directed non-profit model aims 
for three goals: caring instead of competing, sharing instead of bidding and buy-
ing, and sufficiency instead of acquisition and accumulation. Id. at 121 (citing 
KABIR SANJAY BAVIKATTE, STEWARDING THE EARTH: RETHINKING PROPERTY 
AND THE EMERGENCY OF BIOCULTURAL RIGHTS (2014)). 
 122  SELC describes itself as having a “SELCocratic” governance structure, 
one “adapted in part from Holacracy, Sociocracy, and other governance models.” 
SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., INTRODUCTION TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 
LAW CENTER’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE & ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 1 
(2016), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jsN-Ti43vv286gt0CUfEYrYTl_ay 
QLfBR3j34LqgD1Y/edit# [hereinafter SELC INTRODUCTION].  
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there appear to be few organizations that identify themselves specif-
ically as worker self-directed non-profits, SELC has encouraged 
other organizations to consider adopting its model, offering train-
ings to non-profits on the model, creating a community of practice 
for organizations experimenting with the worker self-directed non-
profit model, and sharing significant portions of its own governance 
documents with the public online.123 Section II.A describes the 
structure and decision-making process of worker self-directed non-
profits, as articulated and implemented by SELC. Section II.B then 
describes the roles of the Board of Directors, corporate officers, and 
volunteers in the worker self-directed non-profit model.  
A. Core Features of Worker Self-Directed Non-Profits 
SELC’s worker self-directed non-profit model is built around 
three organizational features: (1) semi-autonomous Circles; (2) 
“moveable roles,” a framework for workers to serve the organization 
in multiple ways; and (3) a Consent process modeled after that of 
holacracy, a business management tool that was itself deeply influ-
enced by sociocracy.124  
1. SEMI-AUTONOMOUS CIRCLES 
SELC is structured using a Circle model somewhat like a socio-
cratic non-profit.125 Each Circle has a purpose defined by the Gen-
eral Governance and Strategy Circle (the “General Circle”), but re-
tains a “fair degree of autonomy to carry out activities that fall 
within their scope.”126 Once created by the General Circle, a Circle 
                                                                                                         
 123  Worker Self-Directed Nonprofits, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., 
http://www.theselc.org/worker_selfdirected_nonprofits (last visited Mar. 21, 
2019). SELC has created a publicly accessible shared drive where many of its 
documents may be downloaded. Sustainable Econ. Law Ctr., [Public] Worker Self 
Directed Nonprofits, GOOGLE DRIVE, https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B_bttt-
Ghy3TWfmFaM1dpRi1RNGpTVDJSODAzZk52RXhpQUtuUG9ZWi1RMnN 
VWWNLclZ4MTQ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  
 124  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1–2; see also supra note 52 and 
accompanying text (describing the influence of sociocracy on holacracy). 
 125  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1. 
 126  Id. 
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may define its own internal projects, create sub-Circles, add new 
members to the Circle, and make other decisions about how to best 
accomplish the mission it was given by the General Circle.127 While 
the General Circle meets several times each month, the organization 
tries “to devolve decision-making to the ‘localest’ scale possible, 
meaning more decision[s] are made within smaller circles, rather 
than the General Circle.”128 Circles are required to notify the Gen-
eral Circle of certain important changes, including the creation of 
new projects, changes in priorities or strategies, or the creation of 
new roles for staff, but they are not required to get permission from 
the General Circle as long as they act in furtherance of their mis-
sions.129 This Circle-level semi-autonomy and the goal of giving 
groups of workers control over their own labor may not be substan-
tially different from the sociocratic non-profit model, but the worker 
self-directed non-profit model makes a number of important 
changes from the sociocratic framework.130  
Unlike most sociocratic non-profits, where the General Circle 
has only representatives from staff-level Departmental Circles, the 
General Circle at SELC is made up of all staff, who collectively 
manage the smaller Circles.131 In other words, staff are not near the 
bottom of the Circle hierarchy with managers above them and the 
Board at the top, but instead management—and even governance—
decisions are made by all organizational staff collectively, with only 
limited Board oversight.132 While all SELC “core staff” are part of 
the General Circle, SELC acknowledges that in a larger worker self-
directed non-profit, the General Circle would have to be made up of 
                                                                                                         
 127  SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CENTER 
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES 2–3 (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id= 
16VifeegSk6CEjBQLHEciydDKpHSWGJl3kXrd2MxynR4 [hereinafter SELC 
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES]. 
 128  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1. 
 129  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 3. 
 130  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. For a discussion of how SELC’s Board delegates some of its govern-
ance obligations to the General Circle, see infra notes 169–76 and accompanying 
text. 
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representatives selected by the smaller Circles, perhaps more like a 
sociocratic non-profit.133 At SELC, smaller Circles are tasked with 
both back-office job functions (like operations or communications) 
and with public-facing programming (providing legal services in 
their various program areas), but the performance of each Circle is 
reported back to the General Circle and, through the General Circle, 
the staff collectively review the work of smaller Circles and set new 
directions and policies for each Circle’s work.134  
 
Figure 4. A worker self-directed non-profit135 
                                                                                                         
 133  SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
OF WORKER SELF DIRECTED NONPROFITS 5, https://drive.google.com/open?id 
=1hVrM1BmZnzjvjWScvs4kxLd0isXnip1b (last visted Apr. 28, 2019) [hereinaf-
ter SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS] (noting that “instead of delegating all of the 
power to a single Executive Director who then exercises the power through hier-
archical structured departments, the Board delegates it to the staff as a collec-
tive”). “Core staff” are all staff who are expected to work more than twenty hours 
per week for more than six months. SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 
127, at 2, 15. 
 134  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 2–3.  
 135  For a more detailed model of SELC’s worker self-directed non-profit struc-
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Worker self-directed non-profit Circles are structured differ-
ently from those of sociocratic non-profits in other ways as well. 
SELC’s Circles are generally made up of only employees—not in-
dependent contractors, volunteers, or members, as they might be in 
some sociocratic non-profits.136 In addition, most staff participate in 
multiple Circles, unlike in most sociocratic non-profits, where staff 
units are largely traditional ones, and most workers who are not 
managers participate in only one or a very few Circles.137 In the 
worker self-directed non-profit structure, a Board of Directors and 
Advisory Board overlap with the General Circle, but a majority of 
the Board of Directors are not employees and there is a more com-
plicated division of management and governance duties between the 
Board Circle and the General Circle than in the more hierarchical 
sociocratic model.138  
2. MOVEABLE ROLES 
One significant difference between professionalized non-profits 
and the mostly volunteer, member-driven civic organizations they 
largely supplanted is that professionalized non-profits rely, like 
most businesses, on specialized, skilled workers: a non-profit’s 
                                                                                                         
ture, see SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CEN-
TER: THE BIG PICTURE (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B6eGM 
Dg0J27kZmttb2ZSdmg1V0k.  
 136  See id. (identifying membership of all Circles). 
 137  See id.  
 138  See infra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. The majority of the Board 
at SELC is made of non-employees because of a provision in the California Cor-
porations Code that requires no more than forty-nine percent (49%) of the Board 
of any California corporation to be made up of interested persons, including em-
ployees, independent contractors, and their families. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 
(West 2019); see SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note 
116 (discussing California’s requirement to include disinterested parties on the 
Board at 49:13–49:22). For a discussion of directors’ duty of care in these organ-
izations and an analysis of the rules regarding employees of a non-profit serving 
on its Board, see infra Section V.A. There is little discussion of the advisory board 
in the SELC literature; this may be because it plays a role similar to other non-
profit advisory boards. 
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grantwriter specializes in grantwriting, its web team has expertise in 
web design, its program staff have experience in their programmatic 
areas, and all grow their skills in their areas of expertise as they con-
tinue to work in those roles.139  SELC argues that such specialization 
tends to promote “hierarchy, bureaucracy, and pay differentials.”140 
At SELC, workers are asked to fill a variety, perhaps even dozens, 
of different roles.141 This improves organizational flexibility and re-
siliency, and promotes greater equality and fairness among work-
ers.142 For example, when a need for additional staffing arises, 
SELC workers are often able to quickly fill the need because some 
of them are already experienced in the role.143 This approach also 
encourages staff to play an active role in their own professional de-
velopment, letting them learn the new skills they wish to pursue.144 
It decreases assumptions about status and worth that come from 
fixed job titles, and allows for workers to improve organizational 
workflow and understand the organization’s operations, “from the 
administrative to the visionary.”145  
Despite that goal, SELC’s moveable roles cannot completely 
mean that staff have no specialization or focus. It seems that many 
staff have core responsibilities that attach to them as individuals: 
non-lawyers cannot simply take over the work that requires a li-
censed attorney, and, even beyond that, the Housing & Cooperatives 
Attorney who leads the Housing program area and the Food & Farm 
Attorney who leads the Food and Farm program area likely cannot 
swap jobs without a substantial loss of subject-matter expertise.146 
                                                                                                         
 139  See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 140  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1. All SELC employees must also 
be categorized as exempt employees for purposes of state and federal overtime 
requirements.  
 141  See id. at 1–2.  
 142  See SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13. 
 143  See id.  
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  See SELC Staff, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., https://www.theselc.org 
/staff (last visited Apr. 28, 2019) (describing staff titles and responsibilities).  
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Still, many administrative roles and secondary or tertiary responsi-
bilities can rotate, allowing workers to pursue their individual inter-
ests, and allowing them to avoid feeling trapped in undesirable 
roles—or roles they cannot perform well—for too long.147  
SELC has twenty-four Circles and, within each Circle, there 
may be anywhere between two and fifteen specific roles.148 A SELC 
employee may be responsible for many roles in a Circle, so a partic-
ular Circle may be made up of only four people, but have fifteen 
different roles.149 Some roles are assigned by Consent to a proposal 
from a Circle member, while others are filled through an election 
process.150 Any individual employee in a worker self-directed non-
profit will have an overall workload that is made up of many differ-
ent roles.151 SELC’s staffing model also includes many other inno-
vations designed to promote employee satisfaction and work-life 
balance, including a thirty-hour work week, flexible scheduling, ro-
bust “upskilling” and professional development opportunities, and 
equal pay for all workers—from the most junior to the Executive 
Director.152  
                                                                                                         
 147  SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13 (describing the 
flexibility allowed workers through the moveable roles); SELC INTRODUCTION, 
supra note 122, at 2 (noting that if a worker is not a good fit for a certain role, he 
or she could be moved to another role without the need to terminate his or her 
employment).  
 148  Assigning Responsibilities in a Worker Self-Directed Nonprofit, SUSTAIN-
ABLE ECON. L. CTR., http://www.theselc.org/assigning_responsibilities (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2019).  
 149  For example, SELC’s Worker Cooperative Circle has four people in it, 
with more than fifteen different roles, including a legal research steward, who 
tracks all outstanding research projects, an intern steward, who operates a summer 
internship program focused on cooperatives, and a Co-opLaw.org Web Master 
who manages the technical aspects of one of SELC’s websites. Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id.  
 152  Cat Johnson, 7 Ways to Create a More Democratic Nonprofit, SHAREABLE 
(July 14, 2015), https://www.shareable.net/blog/7-ways-to-create-a-more-demo-
cratic-nonprofit. 
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3. CONSENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
SELC uses a decision-making process based largely on ho-
lacracy’s meeting process, framing Consent slightly differently than 
in sociocratic organizations: instead of asking whether any Circle 
members have a “reasoned objection,” SELC has Circle members 
ask themselves a more plain-language version of that question: “can 
I live with this?”153 SELC’s meeting process aims to be democratic 
and flexible: any employee is permitted to bring topics up for dis-
cussion in their Circle; meetings have no pre-set agenda, permitting 
an openness to different possibilities; and feedback is given by all 
members of the Circle.154 
The specific procedures used in SELC’s Consent process are 
somewhat different from those of sociocratic non-profits. The Gen-
eral Circle has two kinds of meetings: governance meetings are held 
twice monthly for making decisions on issues that affect the organ-
ization’s mission, policies that impact all staff, or the work or exist-
ence of any Circles;155 tactical meetings are held monthly for moni-
toring ongoing tasks that require regular oversight or action, having 
Circles provide updates to the General Circle on ongoing work, and 
discussing matters that involve coordination between multiple Cir-
cles.156  
Governance meetings begin with the appointment of a facilitator 
and note-taker, followed by a personal check-in, with each member 
of the Circle sharing a high and low from his or her past week157 in 
an effort to create a culture of connectedness among Circle mem-
bers.158 The rest of the meeting is structured around proposals, re-
                                                                                                         
 153  SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 2 (distinguishing this question 
from “is this perfect and do I agree completely?”). 
 154  Id. 
 155  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 3. 
 156  Id. at 5. 
 157  Id. at 3.  
 158  See Meeting Processes and Decision Making, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. 
CTR., http://www.theselc.org/meeting_processes (last visited July 27, 2018). 
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quests to take some action, subject to a sociocracy-like Consent pro-
cess, and triage items, requests for feedback, coordination, infor-
mation, and discussion.159  
Tactical meetings also begin with the appointment of a facilita-
tor and note-taker and a personal check-in.160 The facilitator then 
goes through a list of checklist items, items that need regular action 
or oversight from most or all staff, with staff asked to respond with 
a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” to indicate whether they have 
acted on each item.161 The facilitator goes through a list of currently 
active projects to get updates from the group and discuss whether 
projects have the appropriate resources.162 Circle members may then 
propose new topics for discussion; when such an item is proposed, 
the Circle follows a modified-sociocratic process in which all Circle 
members ask one clarifying question or offer one reaction on the 
topic before returning to the proposer, who may offer a response.163 
After all such agenda items have been discussed or the time allo-
cated for the meeting runs out, the facilitator leads the group in a 
closing activity and closes the meeting.164 
B. The Role of the Board, Corporate Officers, Volunteers, and 
Members in a Worker Self-Directed Non-Profit 
Some sociocratic non-profits permit members, volunteers, and 
other stakeholders into their decision-making Circles, but retain ul-
timate governance power in a relatively small Board Circle;165 the 
North Bay DSA model, on the other hand, elevates members to the 
highest Circle, but it has no organizational staff.166 SELC’s worker 
self-directed non-profit model takes a third approach, carefully 
                                                                                                         
 159  Id. 
 160  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 5. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. at 5–6. 
 163  Id. at 6. 
 164  Id. 
 165  See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
 166  See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
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granting greater organizational control to staff, retaining some im-
portant work for its Board and volunteers, but offering few struc-
tured roles for volunteers or members.167   
1. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
AND “STAFF TRUSTEES” 
In many professionalized non-profits, the Board of Directors 
limits its work to legally mandated governance matters, and dele-
gates routine management of organizational activities to staff lead-
ership.168 In the worker self-directed non-profit, the Board goes be-
yond that to carefully delegate governance powers to a collective of 
self-governing workers, and then provides oversight to ensure that 
the self-governance system is functioning to advance the best inter-
ests of the nonprofit.169 Procedurally, this may be done through ei-
ther organizational bylaws or a Board resolution stating that the 
Board believes that it is in the best interest of the organization to 
have staff govern themselves.170 In either case, any delegation of 
governance powers is limited: the Board retains statutory authority 
to rescind or modify such a resolution or bylaw provision, and the 
Board has ongoing fiduciary obligations to monitor the organiza-
tion.171 SELC argues that this limited delegation of governance pow-
ers moves the Board from the hierarchical top of the organization to 
“the periphery of the organization. . . . [The directors] do not concern 
themselves with programmatic or strategic activities, they function 
only to create accountability and support.”172 
                                                                                                         
 167  See SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1–2 (stating that, at SELC, 
“every staff person is a center of power,” that “employees [are] primary sensors 
of the organization’s needs,” and that the Circle process involves “receiving reac-
tions and for feedback from ALL coworkers” but not delineating a specific gov-
ernance role for members or other stakeholders in its Circles). 
 168  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 169  See SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 5 (noting that 
“instead of delegating all of the power to a single Executive Director who then 
exercises the power through hierarchical structured departments, the Board dele-
gates it to the staff as a collective”).  
 170  Id. at 9–10. 
 171  See SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note 116. 
 172  SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13.  
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SELC staff use a variety of processes to keep its Board informed 
about their work: staff report their activities to the Board at quarterly 
Board meetings; they give the Board access to an online document 
listing monthly accomplishments; staff give most or all Directors 
access to SELC’s internal information and task-management plat-
form to monitor activities and current proposals; and the Board is 
given quarterly updates on the organization’s budget and finances, 
plus ongoing access to organizational budgetary information.173 
This model aims to permit meaningful self-governance by SELC 
staff while providing SELC’s Board with a robust ability to monitor 
the staff’s work. The Board, in turn, is asked to do significant mon-
itoring of the organization: they closely monitor SELC’s activities, 
regularly review financial information and budgets, ensure the or-
ganization’s compliance with applicable laws, review internal poli-
cies and ensure that the staff are properly using the Circle process, 
review and approve compensation, and intervene when the Board 
believes that the staff have made, or are considering making, a deci-
sion that is “overly risky, illegal, threatening to the Law Center’s tax 
exempt status, or contrary to the mission of the Law Center.”174  
SELC describes this model as a “Staff Trusteeship,” likening its 
staff to trustees, who “manage the organization in fulfillment of its 
mission and in trust for the benefit of society and the planet,” and its 
Board to a guardian, “overseeing the activities of the organization 
and ensuring that staff-initiated projects and policies are effectively 
advancing the mission and remaining accountable to the commu-
nity.”175 Despite this unique and perhaps imprecise nomenclature, 
the shifting of some elements of governance from Board to senior 
staff may not be an entirely radical departure from the trend toward 
professionalized non-profits, where it is common for Boards to play 
a limited role in the day-to-day practices of the organization beyond 
providing a measure of general fiduciary oversight.176  
                                                                                                         
 173  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 8. 
 174  SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., BOARD HANDBOOK AND ORIENTATION 
GUIDE  6 (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id=1512BQ-BP0_nouWsl3LV 
WcO9rPUdcPk9q. 
 175  Id. at 5. 
 176  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Indeed, SELC’s Board seems to 
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2. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
The worker self-directed non-profit also has specific oversight 
roles that the Board assigns to individual directors, who SELC calls 
“owls” and who play roles somewhat like those of traditional corpo-
rate officers.177 SELC’s four owls are a Financial Owl, a Worker 
Governance Owl, a Legal Compliance Owl, and a Mission Owl.178 
The Financial Owl, sometimes simply referred to as the Treasurer, 
monitors and communicates quarterly with the SELC Circle respon-
sible for managing SELC’s budget and expenditures.179 The Worker 
Governance Owl reviews proposals and policies adopted by the 
staff, reviews all staff self-assessment forms, and is responsible for 
ensuring that the worker self-governance model is still in the best 
interest of the organization.180 The Legal Compliance Owl, some-
times referred to as the Secretary, ensures that the organization is 
operating in compliance with all relevant laws, including reviewing 
a legal compliance checklist with the organization’s staff.181 The Le-
gal Compliance Owl also is responsible for reviewing concerns that 
have been raised by SELC staff through SELC’s whistleblower and 
grievance protocols.182 Finally, the Mission Owl is responsible for 
reviewing the monthly list of organizational accomplishments to en-
sure that SELC’s operations continue to be in conformity with the 
organization’s mission.183 All of the owls aim to resolve any ques-
tions or concerns that arise in the course of their oversight with the 
                                                                                                         
have far more information regarding the day-to-day budget and quarterly staff 
accomplishments than many non-profit Boards, which often do not understand 
their organizations or their obligations as fiduciaries, and are commonly not 
meaningfully engaged in their Board service. See DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., 
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., 2015 SURVEY ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1–2 (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/ 
publication-pdf/cgri-survey-nonprofit-board-directors-2015.pdf.  
 177  SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 8.  
 178  The Role of the Board, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., http://www.the 
selc.org/role_of_the_board (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).  
 179  Id. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id.  
 182  Id. 
 183  Id.  
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relevant staff Circles, but if any questions or concerns remain after 
those conversations, the owls bring those matters to the Board.184 
SELC also retains a traditional President, who serves the staff rep-
resentative on the Board.185  
3. LIMITED ROLES FOR VOLUNTEERS AND MEMBERS 
Aside from volunteers serving on the Board or Advisory Board, 
the worker self-directed non-profit model as implemented by SELC 
does not offer much opportunity for governance or decision-making 
authority for volunteers or members, although SELC does have pol-
icies for volunteer management.186 SELC acknowledges the im-
portance of external stakeholders in the organization, but outside of 
service on SELC’s Board or Advisory Board, does not appear to 
have a structural role for their input in governance or organizational 
decision-making.187 As part of their role as staff trustees, staff are 
asked to “listen to the needs and ideas of [SELC’s] stakehold-
ers. . . . [and they have] heightened duties to respond to those needs 
and ideas, and, as such, heightened influence within the organiza-
tion.”188 That may be an improvement on the professionalized non-
profit model, which has been criticized for failing to respond to com-
munity members and other outside stakeholders,189 but, ultimately, 
the focus on staff self-governance in the worker self-directed non-
profit model creates a smaller role for non-staff stakeholders than 
the more hierarchical sociocratic non-profit model, in which mem-
bers, volunteers, and other stakeholders may play a more meaning-
ful role in organizational governance.  
                                                                                                         
 184  Id. 
 185  See Board of Directors, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR.,  
https://www.theselc.org/board (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
 186  See SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 18–19 (describ-
ing rules for volunteer management). 
 187  Orsi, supra note 121, at 132. 
 188  Id.  
 189  See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.  
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III. HUB-AND-SPOKE NON-PROFIT COUNTER-INSTITUTIONS 
Where sociocratic non-profits trace their roots to an iconoclastic 
management innovator, and where worker self-directed non-profits 
were inspired by the solidarity economy and commons movements, 
the concept of the counter-institution came most directly out of rad-
ical activist practices.190 New Left activists created the term “coun-
ter-institution” to describe projects rooted in activism but aspiring 
to a degree of permanence—not a short-term street protest or occu-
pation, but a longer-term, typically community-based project aiming 
to fundamentally challenge the institutions, including the non-profit 
institutions, of the status quo.191 Because the concept is closely 
linked with anti-authoritarian activism, the structures of counter-in-
stitutions are closely connected to autonomism, horizontalism, and 
prefigurativism: “counter-institutions . . . are directly democratic, 
are created and run by the people who benefit from them, and are 
independent of control by the State and capital alike.”192 Part III fo-
cuses on one type of structure that has emerged for activists seeking 
                                                                                                         
 190  For a history of anti-authoritarian activism stretching from the fracturing 
of the New Left coalition and the rise of women-of-color feminism, through the 
anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s, the AIDS and radical LGBTQ and environ-
mental movements of the 1980s, the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s 
and 2000s, and the Occupy Movement and Movement for Black Lives of the 
2010s, see Haber, supra note 25, at 324–35. 
 191  Id. at 345–46. Wini Breines, in her study of the New Left, provides the 
following definition of counter-institutions:  
institutions outside the established order organized along radical 
egalitarian principles as a means of building the new society 
within the shell of the old . . . [that] were one of the most im-
portant new left efforts. . . . An emphasis on the political 
“means” in contrast to the political “end” was at their heart.  
WINI BREINES, COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATION IN THE NEW LEFT, 1962–1968: 
THE GREAT REFUSAL 52 (1982). Activist and scholar Carl Boggs called counter-
institutions the “embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of the move-
ment, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human ex-
perience that are the ultimate goal.” Carl Boggs, Marxism, Prefigurative Com-
munism and the Problem of Workers’ Control, RADICAL AM., Winter 1977-1978, 
at 99, 100.  
 192  Caucus Statement, Dual Power: A Strategy to Build Socialism in Our Time, 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM.-LIBERTARIAN SOCIALIST CAUCUS, (Dec. 31, 
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to develop non-profit counter-institutions, what this Article calls a 
“hub-and-spoke” structure.  
Section III.A describes how the hub-and-spoke structure arose 
out of the common anti-authoritarian organizing tactic called the af-
finity group. Section III.B then details how activists have developed 
this organizing tool into a non-profit corporate structure.  
A. Affinity Group Structures 
For decades, anti-authoritarian activists have worked through 
small, decentralized, collaborative “affinity groups,” groups typi-
cally made up of five to fifteen activists that may collaborate with 
other individuals or groups, but that are fully free to take action with-
out direction or guidance from some higher body or organization.193 
The model is a flexible one that has been used in different ways and 
in different contexts, but the ultimate goal of the affinity group struc-
ture is to maximize the autonomy of the small group while allowing 
it to remain connected to a broader community of activists through 
either General Assemblies, gatherings of all members of related af-
finity groups that coordinate their work through direct democ-
racy,194 or spokescouncils, gatherings of a reporter from all affinity 
groups connected to one another through a larger network of allied 
affinity groups.195 Affinity groups commonly make decisions 
through a process activists call “consensus,” which operates some-
what like Consent does in the sociocratic model.196 This activist 
                                                                                                         
2018), https://dsa-lsc.org/2018/12/31/dual-power-a-strategy-to-build-socialism-
in-our-time/. These anti-authoritarian principles are more fully explored supra 
notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 193  DAVID GRAEBER, DIRECT ACTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 288–89 (2009); URI 
GORDON, ANARCHY ALIVE: ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS FROM PRACTICE TO 
THEORY 16 (2008). 
 194  GORDON, supra note 193 at 15–16. 
 195  GRAEBER, supra note 193, at 289. 
 196  See Haber, supra note 25, at 334–35 (describing the intended use of “con-
sensus” in the Occupy Movement, a process in which a General Assembly was 
asked to refine a proposal until no one blocked it, and blocks were only to be 
reserved for rare situations in which a person had a very serious ethical or safety-
related about a proposal). In sociocratic organizations, the Consent process is 
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model of affinity groups managing their own semi-autonomous pro-
jects and reporting back to a collective body of all members from 
other affinity groups or, for larger bodies, designated reporters from 
each group, dates back to the 1970s network of nonviolent activist 
collectives called Movement for a New Society, and was adopted by 
several other movements and groups over time: the anti-nuclear 
movement; 1980s radical LGBTQ groups like ACT UP; radical en-
vironmental groups like Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front 
in the 1980s and 1990s; the anti-globalization movement in the late 
1990s; and the Occupy Movement in the 2000s.197 This affinity 
group model was adopted by activists operating in a non-profit or-
ganizational context to form the core of the hub-and-spoke non-
profit counter-institution model.198  
B. The Hub-and-Spoke Form at Activist Non-Profits 
In the hub-and-spoke non-profit corporate structure, a non-
profit’s constitutive elements—its committees, members, employ-
ees, and Board—are mapped onto an activist General Assembly or 
spokescouncil structure. Depending on the size of the organization, 
either all people affiliated with the organization or just delegates 
from each affinity group coordinate and collaborate through a cen-
tral collective, hub, or steering committee that does not direct the 
work of the individual affinity groups but may help set the general 
direction for the organization with the input of all in the organiza-
tion, and may help to coordinate activities between the different af-
finity groups.199 In most versions of this model, the central hub is 
                                                                                                         
commonly intertwined with the Circle process itself, with each Circle member 
sequentially asked to speak on each proposal even if all would approve of the 
proposal without debate. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. Consen-
sus processes often work that same way, but in some activist groups, especially 
larger ones, meeting facilitators ask participants generally if anyone has any ques-
tions or concerns, or, especially, serious concerns that might lead them to block a 
proposal, but facilitators do not necessarily ask each member to speak on every 
proposal. Haber, supra note 25, at 334–35.  
 197  Haber, supra note 25, at 326–29. 
 198  Id. 
 199  The Spokescouncil (or Delegates’ Meeting), SEEDS FOR CHANGE, 
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distinct from the non-profit Board, which is moved, at least symbol-
ically, to the organizational periphery, as one affinity group among 
others—even if certain legal responsibilities continue to be the do-
main of that particular affinity group.  
One of the first groups to look at ways to bring affinity group 
models into a non-profit corporate context was the Sylvia Rivera 
Law Project (“SRLP”).200 SRLP was created in August 2002 to ad-
dress the poverty and over-incarceration of low-income transgender 
people and transgender people of color.201 Influenced by the service-
provision models of the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords, 
as well as by critiques of the non-profit industrial complex, SRLP 
aims to provide legal assistance and other services to the transgender 
community in an explicitly politicized context.202 Although the 
group was originally supported by law-fellowship funding and 
housed within the Urban Justice Center, a progressive but tradition-
ally-structured legal services organization in New York, SRLP split 
from the Urban Justice Center in order to “create a fully trans organ-
ization governed in some way that would resist the typical race, gen-
der, and class dynamics of poverty law organizations.”203 
As it became an independent organization, instead of looking to 
the organizational models of larger non-profit LGBTQ groups for 
inspiration and guidance, SRLP members studied the structures of a 
variety of activist groups and collectives, and ultimately developed 
an organizational model that looks quite like a network of affinity 
groups that coordinates its work through a collective General As-
sembly of all members of those affinity groups.204 The collective is 
built around six such co-equal affinity groups, which SRLP calls 
teams: (1) the Direct Services Team, which operates SRLP’s legal 
clinic and advocates for policy reform to change the institutions that 
                                                                                                         
https://www.seedsforchange.org.uk/spokescouncil (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).  
 200  See Haber, supra note 25, at 348–49. 
 201  SRLP History, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://www.srlp.org/ 
about/srlp-history (last visited Aug. 11, 2018). 
 202  See Rickke Mananzala & Dean Spade, The Nonprofit Industrial Complex 
and Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y. 53, 63 (2008). 
 203  Id. at 64. 
 204  Id. 
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negatively impact low-income transgender people and transgender 
people of color; (2) the Public Education Team, which coordinates 
trainings, online resources, media, and publications; (3) the Fund-
raising and Finance Team, which fundraises and manages the organ-
ization’s financial systems; (4) the Organizing Support Team, which 
links SRLP to other community-based organizations and connects 
SRLP members to other resources and opportunities for organizing 
on issues that affect them; (5) the Collective Development Team, 
which recruits new collective members and is responsible for inter-
nal anti-oppression work; and (6) the Board Team, the legally-re-
sponsible non-profit corporate Board that generally tries to limit its 
oversight to the minimum-required legal and financial duties for the 
organization.205 Like affinity groups, these bodies work largely in-
dependently from each other, as the collective delegates decision-
making and implementation power to those six teams as much as 
possible.206 Coordination and accountability are encouraged through 
the creation of annual work plans that are used to make sure that the 
“broad strokes of programming” are approved by the broader col-
lective.207 The collective of all affinity groups meets twice each year 
to present their work for the year, give progress reports, discuss pri-
orities, and coordinate their work.208 
                                                                                                         
 205  Haber, supra note 25, at 349 (citing SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, SRLP 
COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK 1–2, 12 (2009), http://srlp.org/files/collec-
tive%20handbook%202009.pdf [hereinafter SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HAND-
BOOK]). 
 206  Id. at 350. 
 207   Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65. 
 208   Id. 
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Figure 4. A hub-and-spoke non-profit counter-institution209 
 
Consistent with anti-authoritarian activists’ typical approach to 
affinity group decision-making, the teams and the larger collective 
all use consensus processes for decision-making.210 Unlike in the 
worker self-directed non-profit model, most of the SRLP collective 
members are volunteers, not paid employees. 211 To help promote 
accountability among these different teams made up of largely vol-
unteers, SLRP requires that each team have at least one full-time 
staff person on it.212 Similarly, to further promote consistency and 
accountability, all collective members are asked to commit to work-
ing with the group for at least a year at a specified number of hours 
each month.213 The Collective Development Team makes sure that 
                                                                                                         
 209  See SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 5 (pre-
senting a similar structure for their organization).  
 210   Id. at 2, 14. 
 211  Cf. Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65. 
 212   SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 1; Mananzala 
& Spade, supra note 202, at 65. 
 213  SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 21. 
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each team maintains a majority of people of color as well as a ma-
jority of trans, intersex, or gender-nonconforming people.214 Volun-
teers, staff, and Board all participate in the twice-yearly collective 
meetings, and, like in a General Assembly, all have an equal say in 
decision-making for the collective.215 Maintenance of their egalitar-
ian, participatory structure is part of the core mission of the group,216 
as SRLP aims not just to provide legal services and organize around 
issues affecting low-income trans communities and trans communi-
ties of color, but to “create structures that model our vision of a more 
just society . . . . [and] to use a non-hierarchical structure to support 
work that aims to redistribute power and wealth for a more just so-
ciety.”217 
Other non-profit groups have experimented with similar models. 
Inspired by SRLP and the Occupy Movement, Mayday Community 
Space (“Mayday”) is a community space and a home for community 
organizations and social movements in the historically low-income 
and predominantly Latino—but rapidly gentrifying—neighborhood 
of Bushwick, Brooklyn.218 Mayday seeks to use the space to build 
connections between different groups of activists, different move-
ments, and local community residents, to foster a “broader social 
justice community, allowing for the cross-pollination of ideas and 
relationships,”219 all in a context of political solidarity and horizon-
talism.220 The organizational structure developed by Mayday shares 
                                                                                                         
 214   Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65. 
 215  SRLP, FROM THE BOTTOM UP, supra note 26, at 12–13. 
 216   SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 1. 
 217   Id. 
 218   MAYDAY SPACE, MAYDAY SPACE HANDBOOK 3 (2018), 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W5p9AKFbHGLUhZKY_zfGxVontKbvg 
2ZopSfIHQoaaSU/ 
 219   Id. at 4. 
 220  To use the space, Mayday requires that individuals and groups agree to an 
anti-oppression statement, which includes commitments to, among other things, 
“a political culture grounded in solidarity, respect, listening, cooperation, kind-
ness and non-dogmatism,” “prioritize conflict de-escalation over police involve-
ment,” “ongoing awareness of our prejudices, the structures of oppression that 
affect our personal experiences, and our privileges (by virtue of being white, male, 
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much in common with SRLP, with a similar core collective that co-
ordinates activities between different affinity groups and a prefer-
ence for consensus decision-making.221 The Mayday Collective is 
responsible for day-to-day project management and oversight of 
Mayday by consensus rules, although if consensus cannot be 
achieved, the collective acccepts a fallback of a two-thirds superma-
jority to approve a proposal.222 
IV. SWARM ORGANIZATIONS 
Like sociocracy, the concept of the swarm organization was in-
itially developed by one person who came to experiment with new 
organizational structures after working in the worlds of technology 
and entrepreneurship. Rick Falkvinge is a Swedish technologist 
whose opposition to copyright law norms led him to found the Swe-
dish Pirate Party and develop the idea of the swarm organization in 
the process.223 Section IV.A will focus on the core model of the 
swarm organization developed by Falkvinge, and Section IV.B will 
describe different ways that U.S. activist groups have been experi-
menting with that model in their organizations. 
A. The Pirate Party and the Birth of Swarm Organizations 
Falkvinge tells the origin story of the Swedish Pirate Party this 
way: he had the idea to create a political party that catered to the 1.2 
million Swedish citizens who were violating copyright law through 
illegal file sharing; he made a “very rudimentary” website, and 
wrote a one-sentence post announcing the new site on a file-sharing 
website on January 1, 2006.224 By the next day, the Swedish Pirate 
Party was national news, and by 2009 Pirate Parties had a presence 
                                                                                                         
cis-gendered, able-bodied, a U.S. citizen, wealthy, and/or straight, among other 
identities) in this society,” and “hearing each other and creating opportunities for 
all voices to be heard, especially those that have been historically marginalized or 
silenced.” Id. at 7–8. 
 221  Haber, supra note 25, at 351–52.  
 222  MAYDAY SPACE, supra note 218, at 6–7. 
 223  RICK FALKVINGE, SWARMRISE: THE TACTICAL MANUAL TO CHANGING 
THE WORLD 13, 15 (2013). 
 224  Id. at 13, 27–33. 
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in dozens of countries and received 225,915 votes in the European 
Parliamentary elections—a rate of growth “unlike anything the 
MBAs have seen.”225  
To organize the new members and volunteers of the Swedish 
Pirate Party, Falkvinge sought to create a structure that allowed for 
maximizing scalability and rapid growth while retaining trust among 
group members—what he came to call a “swarm organization.”226 
                                                                                                         
 225  Id. at 13, 27–33, 187. Other notable Pirate Parties include the Pirate Parties 
of Germany and Iceland, both of which are built around new tools for large-group 
decision-making that allow individual members to vote through either represent-
atives or direct-democratic voting on any one decision, including “liquid democ-
racy” and “liquid feedback.” Alexander Kolokotronis & Sam Nakayama, Ground-
work to a Socialist Party: A Democratized Caucus Within the Democratic Party, 
GRASSROOTS ECON. ORGANIZING, http://www.geo.coop/blog/groundwork-social 
ist-party-democratized-caucus-within-democratic-party (last visited Apr. 19, 
2019). See Dominik Schiener, Liquid Democracy: True Democracy for the 21st 
Century, MEDIUM (Nov. 23, 2015), https://medium.com/organizer-sandbox/liq-
uid-democracy-true-democracy-for-the-21st-century-7c66f5e53b6f; Melanie 
Sevcenko, Pirate Party Docks at Berlin’s Parliament, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 31, 
2012), https://psmag.com/news/pirate-party-docks-at-berlins-parliament-39443.  
The social impact of these Pirate Parties has been very mixed. The Pirate 
Party of Iceland found parliamentary success in Iceland’s 2016 elections, cam-
paigning for radical institutional reforms and more direct democracy. Agence 
France-Presse in Reykjavik, Iceland’s Pirate Party Invited to Form Government, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/02/ice-
land-pirate-party-invited-form-government-coalition. But the German Pirate 
Party’s original leadership left the party over a variety of scandals and the group’s 
tolerance for political amateurism and resistance to a clear ideological vision has 
been argued to have helped lay the groundwork for the rise of the far-Right Alter-
native für Deutschland party. Josephnie Huetlin, The Rise and Fall of the Pirate 
Party, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/137305 
/rise-fall-pirate-party (linking the disarray of the German Pirate Party, “part per-
formance art, part cult, part prank,” to the rise of Alternative für Deutschland, 
“very much a party, with ideological convictions and a thirst for power”).  
Similar experiments with online tools for participatory democracy at the level 
of the state have been proposed or experimented with in Argentina, Taiwan, and 
Spain. Kolokotronis & Nakayama, supra (describing the Net Party in Argentina 
and their platform DemocracyOS, online participatory voting tools developed by 
the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, and the influence of social movements on 
city-level electoral politics in Barcelona and Madrid). 
 226  FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 57–58. Other organizations and businesses 
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The swarm organization “consists almost entirely of loosely knit ac-
tivists,”227 but—designed by Falkvinge with the specific goal of be-
ing more coordinated than leaderless activist groups like the Occupy 
Movement and Anonymous228—the swarm of activists is organized 
around a structure or a “scaffolding” of officers and organizational 
roles that support the activists.229 The Swedish Pirate Party was or-
ganized by geography, so it was structured around small groups rep-
resenting a county, city, or urban district, all arranged in a series of 
“mini-pyramids.”230 The model is designed to be scalable, so a struc-
ture might initially only be filled at the county level, but, as the 
group grows, each level expands to have individuals populate each 
box of a sprawling organizational chart.231  
                                                                                                         
have used the “swarm” metaphor to describe their operations or management, in-
cluding some that predate Falkvinge. See Vladimir Dimitrov, Swarm-Like Dy-
namics and Their Use in Organization and Management 12 COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
413 (2000). Today, activist groups using the label are most closely inspired by 
Falkvinge. A renewed interest in how swarms in nature operate began within the 
field of artificial intelligence in the 1990s, which perhaps led to interest in the 
concept among technologists like Falkvinge. The term “swarm intelligence” was 
introduced by Gerardo Beni and Jing Wang in an influential 1989 paper, and the 
term has become widely used in the fields of robotics and artificial intelligence to 
describe collective behavior that acts with “intelligence” even if its individual, 
autonomous parts are unaware of the group’s purpose, like ants building a colony, 
the growth of bacteria, or certain artificial intelligence designs. See Gerardo Beni 
& Jing Wang, Swarm Intelligence in Cellular Robotic Systems, in ROBOTS AND 
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: TOWARDS A NEW BIONICS? 703, 703–12 (Pablo Dario et 
al. eds., 1993). 
 227  FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 45. 
 228  Id. at 11. 
 229  Id. at 45–46. 
 230  Id. at 54–56. 
 231  Id. at 70–72. 
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Figure 5. A section of a swarm organizational chart232 
 
Like sociocracy, the swarm model is built around small groups, 
but there are not formal, coordinated links from one small group to 
the next; instead,  “everybody communicates with everybody else 
all the time.”233 The swarm structure is built around groups of no 
more than seven people, which Falkvinge argues is the maximum 
size for effective collaboration because larger groups require spend-
ing too much time and effort on relationship management.234 Ulti-
mately, in every part of these geographical groupings, there should 
be up to, but no more than, seven leaders, and each of those leaders 
could have a variety of sub-leaders and deputies.235 For example, in 
Figure 5, a person coordinating city-level work may have one or two 
deputies and four “function officers”: a public relations or media 
person responsible for working with newspapers, television, and ra-
dio; an activism leader whose job is to support the practical details 
for activists in the swarm, like getting permits or obtaining loud-
speaker equipment; a swarmcare leader responsible for welcoming 
new members and monitoring the swarm; and an information and 
web leader who maintains the online presence for the local work of 
the swarm.236 Each of the function officers may have deputies, but 
most of the work should be coordinated in teams of no more than 
                                                                                                         
 232  Id. at 56.  
 233  Id. at 13.  
 234  Id. at 54. 
 235  Id. at 48–49. 
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seven people, and when groups in the swarm start to outgrow that 
number, leaders should consider sub-dividing them, for instance, di-
viding the City into no more than seven neighborhoods or dis-
tricts.237 While leaders formally appoint volunteers to these roles, 
the goal is that people should be given these titles after they have 
already informally stepped into these roles: “the organizational chart 
should lag slightly behind the observed reality.”238 
The leader and officer roles in swarm organizations may be less 
top-down than they sound. The swarm officers, for Falkvinge, 
should not be managers in a traditional sense, but rather should be 
responsible for making sure the swarm “has everything it needs to 
self-organize,” not telling people in the swarm what to do, but ra-
ther: (1) promoting speed by removing organizational bottlenecks; 
(2) improving trust among members of the swarm by maintaining 
strict transparency; and (3) improving scalability by building the 
scaffolding to its full size from the start of the swarm so that people 
can join and easily find a place for their work.239  
In addition to all of these small groups that help to structure the 
activism of the swarm,240 Falkvinge acknowledges that larger 
groups may sometimes be necessary for formal and informal com-
munication and coordination among both officers and activists 
within the swarm. But in order to encourage the group to grow effi-
ciently, he argues that leaders must aim to cap even informal large-
group discussion at 150 people.241 A more useful size for a larger 
group, he argues, is a group of no more than thirty people, an “ex-
tended family” who all know each other, but who do not typically 
collaborate closely.242 This might include an assembled group of all 
officers and leaders for a certain function or a certain geography.243 
All of these numerical targets should be monitored by officers and 
leaders and when a group grows beyond those targets, it should be 
                                                                                                         
 237  See id. at 62. 
 238  Id. at 63-64. 
 239  Id. at 64–65. 
 240  Id. at 55. 
 241  Id. at 56–58. 
 242  Id. at 59. 
 243  Id.  
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split.244 Officers and leaders must be willing to make and enforce 
such splits, to appoint other officers, delegate authority, take on dep-
uties or assistants, and to do so without direction from any supervi-
sor.245  
From the perspective of an individual member of the swarm, the 
swarm should be decentralized and collaborative, with authority del-
egated “to the point where anybody can make almost any decision 
for the entire organization.”246 It should be open to anyone and its 
operations should be transparent, with financial information and dis-
cussions of strategy and tactics open for the participation of all mem-
bers.247 The model encourages collaboration and communication 
among members of the swarm and aims for people working in one 
part of the swarm to learn from what others in the swarm are doing; 
toward that end, the swarm should have some kind of digital or phys-
ical work space for sharing ideas, slogans, campaigns, and any other 
information that falls within the overall vision of the swarm.248  
The swarm organization model shares a number of elements in 
common with the other organizational models described in Parts I 
through III. The small coordinating groups call to mind sociocracy, 
although Falkvinge retreats from the Consent decision-making 
model of Sociocracy, instead arguing that small group decision-
making should be done through what he calls a “consensus circle,” 
which requires the unanimity of all present in order to agree to any 
action.249 Like in the hub-and-spoke counter-institution, there is 
great freedom for individuals in the swarm to choose their own ac-
tivities, and to work toward goals in a self-managed way, allowing 
activists in the swarm to form their own projects and collaborate as 
they see fit.250  
                                                                                                         
 244  Id. at 59–60. 
 245  Id. at 203. To facilitate that power, the swarm’s organizational chart should 
initially have “tons of empty boxes everywhere.” Id. 
 246  Id. at 14.  
 247  Id. at 19–20. 
 248  Id. at 96. 
 249  Id. at 165–67. 
 250  Id. at 63.  
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While parts of the swarm organization parallel the other activist 
organization models, in other ways Falkvinge seems to have been 
unable to escape conventional corporate models and the start-up cul-
ture from which he emerged, as can be seen most clearly in the 
unique role he reserves for organizational founders. In his model, 
the founder should set the vision and specific goals for the swarm, 
as without one or more specific goals, the swarm could be lost to 
“discussing its purpose in life.”251 Beyond that, because the partici-
pants in the swarm have substantial freedom to set their specific 
tasks toward the larger goal, he argues that it is essential that the 
founder establish the culture of the swarm, so that critical work pro-
cesses do not become obscured by lengthy debates into processes, 
conflict resolution procedures, or similar discussions that can grind 
the swarm’s work to a halt.252 There appears to be no mechanism for 
the organization to move away from the founder’s original vision, 
which risks entrenching internal hierarchy and founder’s syn-
drome253 even more than “professionalized” non-profit organiza-
tions, where there is ordinarily some process by which an organiza-
tion’s Board or members could amend corporate bylaws or modify 
the organizations’s purpose.254 
This creep of hierarchy can be seen in other parts of Falkvinge’s 
model as well. While the swarm structure is described as non-hier-
archical and autonomous, it is hard to imagine that a city-level of-
                                                                                                         
 251  Id. at 87.  
 252  Id. at 87–88. 
 253  Founder’s syndrome is widely discussed among both business and non-
profit start-ups and refers to organizational founders who are unable to delegate 
authority or allow investors or others to take any authority over an organization. 
See Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2008), 
https://hbr.org/2008/02/the-founders-dilemma; Stephen R. Block & Steven Ros-
enberg, Toward an Understanding of Founder’s Syndrome: An Assessment of 
Power and Privilege Among Founders of Nonprofit Organizations, 12 NON-
PROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 353, 354 (2002). 
 254  See, e.g., Joanne Fritz, When and How to Legally Change Your Nonprofit’s 
Mission, BALANCE SMALL BUS., https://www.thebalancesmb.com/legally-
change-your-nonprofits-mission-2502228 (last updated Nov. 18, 2018) (describ-
ing the process to amend a typical non-profit’s mission or purpose). 
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ficer who is invited by a county-level officer to attend a thirty-per-
son coordination team meeting is not, at least in some ways, made 
to feel more central or more important to the organization than ac-
tivists who are not invited to that meeting.255 Even beyond that, 
Falkvinge is quite honest in his description of the need to take un-
compromising, top-down action against internal critics.256 He de-
scribes multiple strategies for dealing with “mavericks,” those who 
would go counter to “swarmthink,” including manipulative strate-
gies like showering attention on a maverick’s allies for work that 
comports with the founder’s vision in order to isolate the dissenter 
and reduce his or her influence within the swarm.257 While activist 
organizations may sometimes need to take steps to remove an agent 
provocateur or someone aiming to intentionally tear apart the group, 
Falkvinge’s embrace of strong-arm tactics toward “mavericks” 
points to his tendency to put efficiency and loyalty to the founder’s 
original vision above a deep commitment to prefigurative politics.  
B. Activist Groups Adopt the Swarm Organization Model 
Despite the presence of these hierarchical elements in 
Falkvinge’s swarm model, several noteworthy U.S. activist groups 
have looked to the idea of the swarm organization for inspiration. 
This Section will look at how U.S. groups have begun to experiment 
with the swarm model and the changes they have made to 
Falkvinge’s original vision. It will consider three groups that have 
embraced some version of the swarm organization, less to shed light 
on any of these specific groups than to show how this trend among 
activist organizations is emerging: IfNotNow, which organizes Jew-
ish people in the United States to fight against the Israeli occupation 
                                                                                                         
 255  Indeed, having clear rules on how to progress up a hierarchy might well be 
preferable to a hierarchy that is obscured or invisible, thriving on friendship 
cliques, interpersonal power dynamics, and unwritten rules. See generally Jo Free-
man, The Tyranny of Structurelessness, JOFREEMAN.COM, https://www.jofree-
man.com/joreen/tyranny.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
 256  See FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 180–81. 
 257  Id. (reminding would-be founders to always “remember that an organiza-
tion is people, and that attention is reward”). 
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of Palestine;258 Movimiento Cosecha, a movement organization that 
fights for “permanent protection, dignity, and respect” for undocu-
mented immigrants in the United States;259 and Demand Utopia, a 
communalist group that aims for a “new imaginative order . . . that 
advance[s] images and ideals of a world beyond the shackles and 
social divides of this one.”260 All three aim to be national organiza-
tions with active, decentralized memberships, and while none may 
be conventionally stuctured non-profits, IfNotNow is a non-profit 
corporation chartered in Washington D.C., and both IfNotNow and 
Movimiento Cosecha receive tax-deductible donations.261 
IfNotNow and Movimiento Cosecha share much in common, and 
both groups were shaped by participation in training programs run 
by a group called Momentum, a “training institute and movement 
incubator” that helps to launch activist groups using the swarm 
model.262 
                                                                                                         
 258  Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW, https://ifnotnowmovement.org/about-us/our-
strategy/ (last visted Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW].  
 259  About Our Movement, COSECHA, https://www.lahuelga.com/about/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter About Our Movement, COSECHA].  
 260  About: Can We Build a New World in the Ashes of the Old?, DEMAND 
UTOPIA, https://demandutopia.net/about/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter 
About, DEMAND UTOPIA]. 
 261  IfNotNow has 501(c)(3) status. See Tax Exempt Organizations Search, 
IfNotNow, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,  https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/display-
All.do?dispatchMethod=displayAllInfo&Id=649963&ein=475178715 (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2019). Both IfNotNow and Movimiento Cosecha receive tax-exempt 
donations through a fiscal sponsor, Act Blue Charities. See Donate, COSECHA, 
https://secure.actblue.com/donate/cosecha?refcode=lahuelganavesp (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2019); Support IfNotNow in Fighting for Freedom and Dignity for All 
Israelis and Palestinians, IFNOTNOW, https://secure.actblue.com/donate/ 
ifnotnow?refcode=Website (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).  
 262  MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommunity.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2019); Momentum Movements, MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommu-
nity.org/movements (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). In addition to Movimiento Co-
secha and IfNotNow, Momentum has more recently worked with the climate-jus-
tice organization, Sunrise Movement. Id. IfNotNow credits Momentum and Mo-
vimiento Cosecha with teaching it “the swarm language.” Healing Justice Pod-
cast: Building Liberatory Movement Cultures – IfNotNow, PODBEAN (Feb. 13, 
2018), https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-pp4ep-86fa2d.  
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To look at how these groups have modified Falkvinge’s model, 
elements of the swarm model will be divided into three sections: (1) 
parts of the swarm model that are consistent with anti-authoritarian 
values and in line with the previously described activist non-profit 
experiments; (2) parts of the swarm model that are inconsistent with 
those values, like the unique position Falkvinge reserves for the 
founder’s vision for the group; and (3) parts of the swarm model that 
aim for efficiency but that may ultimately hold little value. 
1. ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL 
The elements of the swarm model that are most in line with anti-
authoritarian principles have been embraced by all three of these 
groups. IfNotNow, Movimiento Cosecha, and Demand Utopia each 
preserve or expand on member autonomy and self-management 
throughout the organization, and all highlight the ability of all mem-
bers to communicate freely across parts of the broader swarm.263  
In a series of videos showing a training session coordinated by a 
group called Ayni Institute, members of IfNotNow, Movimiento 
Cosecha, and other groups present an in-depth description of how 
they use the swarm model.264 Although they do not always describe 
exactly how their specific groups may differ from each other or the 
degree to which they may have modified Falkvinge’s model, they 
focus substantial attention on how their groups are structured auton-
omously, or, in one description of this model, how each operates as 
a “decentralized, self-organized smart network.”265 IfNotNow al-
lows any three or more members to autonomously “decide to take 
an action, build a community event, hold a Shabbat dinner, [or do] 
anything that builds community and works to end the occupa-
tion.”266 Demand Utopia puts a similar emphasis on autonomy and 
                                                                                                         
 263  See generally Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW, supra note 258; About Our Move-
ment, COSECHA, supra note 259; About, DEMAND UTOPIA, supra note 260. 
 264  See, e.g., Ayni Institute, SWARM 4: Self-Organizing Decentralized Net-
works, Part 1, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=sYkXsYMhHdA [hereinafter Anyi Institute, SWARM 4]. 
 265  See id. (discussing the format of a “decentralized, self-organized smart-
network” at 21:20–21:35). 
 266  Judaism Unbound Podcast: Episode 124: IfNotNow – Ilana Levinson, Jill 
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freedom for its members, emphasizing “the three utopian rule”: “if 
three utopians agree on an action, they can act in the name of the 
organization . . . no permission is necessary!”267 For Demand Uto-
pia, the goal is to provide “creative agency” for members to develop 
their own activities in support of their organizational goals.268 With 
that freedom comes the need for individual members to take respon-
sibility for the overall organization’s work: “if you think something 
needs to be done, you just do it, without asking anybody. If other 
people think that your initiative is good, they will join in. . . . It is 
every activist’s right and responsibility to go where he or she feels 
he or she can contribute the most.”269 Some IfNotNow members de-
scribe how they value that autonomy precisely because it departs 
from the failings identified by critics of the non-profit industrial 
complex: “[T]here’s not a staff hierarchy making all the key deci-
sions. . . . [Decisions are] based on what we actually want and need 
and think is important, and not based on fundraising decisions which 
often [are] in the mix when you have a staff and board structure.”270 
All three groups also underscore the importance of the free flow 
of information around their groups. IfNotNow and Movimiento Co-
secha describe how communication does not go from the top down, 
but should circulate freely around throughout the swarm, as different 
seven-person groups get information from other seven-person 
groups on how they may have coordinated some action.271 Demand 
Utopia, similarly, aims for “people [to] inspire one another across 
all levels and all geographies, with the only common factor being 
the overall goals of the Swarm.”272 
                                                                                                         
Raney, JUDAISM UNBOUND (June 22, 2018), https://www.judaismunbound.com/ 
podcast/2018/6/22/judaism-unbound-episode-124-ifnotnow. 
 267  DEMAND UTOPIA, HIVE BY-LAWS 3, https://docs.google.com/docu-
ment/d/1uwMhLN1iJcMHoohy5vKyoeRq06WuPY4I05pD_AZnyFs/edit [here-
inafter DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS]. 
 268  Coffee with Comrades Podcast: Episode 30: “A Life Cult” ft. Demand Uto-
pia, COFFEE WITH COMRADES (Jan. 28, 2019), http://coffeewithcomrades.com/ 
website/episode-30-a-life-cult-ft-demand-utopia. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Judaism Unbound Podcast, supra note 266.  
 271  See Ayni Institute, SWARM 4, supra note 264. 
 272  See DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 1.  
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2. REGRESSIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL 
The swarm model presented by Falkvinge contains elements that 
seem inconsistent with anti-authoritarian principles, and out of step 
with the approaches taken by the other activist organizational mod-
els described in this Article. This is clear in both the substantial 
power reserved for the organizational founder such that there ap-
pears to be no realistic way for the organization to change direction 
or tactics without that individual, and in Falkvinge’s willingness to 
launch top-down, even manipulative efforts to isolate those who 
would raise concerns about the overall workings of the group.273 
Few of these attributes appear to be embraced by the activist 
groups considered in this Section, and in some cases, steps have 
been taken to modify Falkvinge’s model to be more democratic. One 
helpful concept here is articulated by Carlos Saavedra, a founder of 
both the Ayni Institute and Momentum and a member of Mo-
vimiento Cosecha,274 who distinguishes between a “decentralized 
organization with centralized design” and a “decentralized organi-
zation with decentralized design.”275 Movimiento Cosecha is clear 
that it has a centralized design and describes its process as one of 
“frontloading,” with “rules, procedures, structure, vision established 
explicitly at the beginning of the process, so we can operate with as 
much autonomy as possible while retaining unity.”276 This sounds 
somewhat like the Swedish Pirate Party model, but Movimiento Co-
secha also notes that its model did not spring forth from one sole 
founder, but was developed by a group of activists and organizers 
collaborating over the course of two years of planning.277 The group 
                                                                                                         
 273  See FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 180–81.  
 274  Our Team, AYNI INST., https://ayni.institute/our-team/ (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019); Meet Our Team, MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommunity.org/ 
team (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).  
 275  Ayni Institute, SWARM 2: What is Decentralized Organization? Part 2, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=h7Q2-SgwBtg& 
(distinguishing between decentralized organizations with centralized control and 
decentralized organizations with decentralized control at 15:20–16:28).  
 276  Id. (discussing frontloading at 21:35–23:30). 
 277  Id. (discussing the development of a “completely decentralized organiza-
tion” from 20:55–21:15).  
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does not describe any efforts to manipulate or isolate members who 
do not go along with the founders’ vision, but the “decentralized 
organization with centralized design” concept does raise the ques-
tion of what should happen when members of the organization have 
concerns about the overall organization’s design, goals, or cul-
ture.278 Falkvinge answers this question with a top-down, authori-
tarian answer, but Movimiento Cosecha and other groups embracing 
the “decentralized organization with centralized design” framework 
do not appear to have publicly addressed this question yet.279  
Demand Utopia takes a radically different approach, one that 
presents a clear path for members to change the overall organiza-
tion.280 While Demand Utopia retains the mini-pyramid structure of 
the Swedish Pirate Party, it upends the logic of the mini-pyramids 
when it gets to the highest levels of the structure.281 Unlike in 
Falkvinge’s original model, where the highest levels come closer 
and closer to the founder and, presumably, his or her deputies, allies, 
and others who are likely to share a common vision,282 Demand Uto-
pia makes the top level of the scaffolding a General Assembly, an 
annual gathering open to substantially all active organizational 
members, a group specifically tasked with assessing the strategic vi-
sion for the group and making changes to the goals or structure of 
the group if necessary.283 Although this makes the largest decision-
making body for the organization far more democratic, it remains 
partially restricted, as attendance at the General Assembly is only 
open to members who have reached the rank of “Green One,” which 
is obtained by completing three tasks (“badges”) that are aligned 
with the organization’s mission and “being vouched for by at least 
two” other members.284 In this approach, much depends on how 
these rules are enforced and how restrictive or unrestrictive mem-
bers are at “vouching” for newcomers; still, Demand Utopia’s model 
                                                                                                         
 278  See id. 
 279  See id. 
 280  See DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 5–9. 
 281  Id. at 7. 
 282  FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 55–56. 
 283  DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 4. 
 284  Id.  
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attempts to balance preserving the group’s original vision with al-
lowing for meaningful membership control over even the fundamen-
tals of the organization’s goals, strategy, and structure.  
3. ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL THAT SEEK EFFICIENCY 
WITHOUT HIERARCHY 
Mission-driven organizations that grant autonomy to their mem-
bers to undertake critical tasks for the organization without any top-
down direction understandably tend to be very concerned with effi-
ciency. Where the sociocratic model uses a hierarchy of Circles, and 
where both the worker self-directed non-profit and the hub-and-
spoke models constrain their Boards, leaving some traditionally 
Board-led work to a collective of workers or members, swarm or-
ganizations highlight the autonomy of their small groups, even when 
some underlying hierarchy continues to exist, and without much dis-
cussion of a Board—even when one exists.285  
Despite sometimes retaining Boards and officers, swarm organ-
izations generally do not seem to rely on Board direction and top-
down structures to impose efficiency like professionalized non-prof-
its do. Instead, Falkvinge’s model places significant faith in the 
power of small teams of no more than seven people to work effi-
ciently. Interestingly, the groups described in this section seem, to 
some degree, to depart from Falkvinge’s faith in the power of work-
ing in teams of seven people. Both Movimiento Cosecha and 
IfNotNow seem to identify less with the mini-pyramid scaffolding 
                                                                                                         
 285  IfNotNow, for instance, has a Board that seems to lead on certain adminis-
trative, governance, and fundraising matters, even if it remains relatively hands-
off when it comes to programmatic oversight. Judaism Unbound Podcast, supra 
note 266 (“I was about to say we don’t have a Board, but for administrative and 
fundraising reasons we do actually have a 501(c)(3) status and a Board. But some 
very smart people put that Board together and by-laws together in ways that make 
that Board separate from our decision-making.”). Similarly, the Sunrise Move-
ment, while using the swarm organization model for its organizing, is also built 
around affiliated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) entities, each with Boards and officers. 
See Tax Returns, SUNRISE MOVEMENT, https://www.sunrisemovement.org/tax-
returns; Sunrise Movement Education Fund, GUIDESTAR, https://www.guide 
star.org/profile/46-4773036.  
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and more closely with a “decentralized, self-organized network,” 
which they depict as shaped more like a circle.286 Demand Utopia 
does retain the scaffolding of mini-pyramids in its model,287 but de-
parts radically from the Swedish Pirate Party structure at its highest 
level by situating the group’s ultimate governance and decision-
making authority in the hands of a General Assembly.288 Unfortu-
nately, none of these groups seem to directly challenge Falkvinge’s 
arguments about the importance of working in teams of seven, larger 
groups of thirty, and very large groups of 150 people, despite the 
very questionable pseudoscience underlying his claims.289  
                                                                                                         
 286  See Ayni Institute, SWARM 5: Self-Organizing Decentralized Networks 
Part 2, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
B7bgNQrHbeQ. IfNotNow and Movimento Cosecha are both affiliated with Ayni 
Institute and Movement Netlab. About Us, AYNI INST., https://ayni.insti-
tute/about/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019); Collaborations, MOVEMENT NETLAB, 
https://movementnetlab.org/partners/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
 287  Demand Utopia uses something much more like the original model, with a 
series of pyramids structured from the smallest groups to the largest: at the bottom 
are the leaders of each Cypher (three to seven people); above them are the leaders 
of each Pod (three to five Cyphers, roughly thirty people); above them are the 
leaders of each Polis (three to five Pods, roughly 150 people); above them are the 
leaders of each Zona (three to five Polis, roughly 750 people). DEMAND UTOPIA 
BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 5. 
 288  See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text. 
 289  In an analysis of the Falkvinge model, it bears noting that his arguments 
on the efficiency of teams of seven, thirty, and 150 are very questionable. 
Falkvinge argues that teams of seven are efficient because for seven people to 
have a relationship with one another, there are a total of twenty-one relationships 
(A-B, A-C, A-D, A-E, A-F, A-G, A-H, B-C, B-D, etc.); among eight people, there 
are twenty-eight relationships. FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 52–57. So, he rea-
sons, adding an eighth person would add fourteen percent (14%) more work, but 
require thirty-three percent (33%) more time to manage the relationships. Id. at 
54. Any empirical consideration of a social grouping would show that math to be 
flawed, and deeply dependent on the situation. See id. at 52–57. The idea that 
managing the relationships of players on a soccer team of eleven players (fifty-
five relationships) would be so radically different from managing the relationships 
of players on a baseball team of nine players (thirty-six relationships) that it would 
take fifty-two percent (52%) more effort to manage the team’s interpersonal rela-
tionships seems more likely to be a mathematical quirk than a verifiable metric. 
Falkvinge’s rationale for capping the larger group at 150 people is based on 
“Dunbar’s number,” a principle described by British anthropologist Robin Dunbar 
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V. GOVERNANCE CONSTRAINTS ON THE  
NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFIT MODELS 
Informed and inspired by the solidarity economy and commons 
movements, the Occupy Movement and the Movement for Black 
Lives, anti-authoritarian principles of autonomy, horizontalism, and 
prefigurativism, and the critiques of the non-profit industrial com-
plex, activists have been developing innovative non-profit structures 
that move away from the professionalized non-profit model to better 
reflect their political values. While the structures described in this 
Article, and their many potential variations, share certain similari-
ties, there are important differences between these models that ac-
tivist groups considering non-profit vehicles for their work and their 
lawyers should carefully consider in order to create appropriate 
structures for their projects. For activist groups that decide to form 
                                                                                                         
about how large a meaningful social network can be. Id. at 57. While it is not at 
all clear that the social network Dunbar describes is applicable in this context, 
even if it were, there are two substantial problems with how Falkvinge tries to do 
so. Falkvinge argues, somewhat in line with Dunbar, that because of the biology 
of the human brain, people can only relate to 150 people, and so that should be 
the top size of the group. But Dunbar’s argument is that this number is an average, 
and people’s actual ability to maintain a social network ranges between 100 and 
230 people, and 150 people is a rough estimate of the average. See id.; R.I.M. 
Dunbar, Co-Evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans, 
16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681, 686–87 (1993). In other words, if we accept 
Falkvinge’s application of Dunbar’s study to the social movement large-group 
context, we have inhibited roughly half—the half of people whose brains permit 
them to have social networks smaller than the mean—of the group from meaning-
ful participation. Even beyond that, Dunbar’s studies have been criticized by other 
anthropologists for relying too much on biological determinants, and not taking 
into account social and cultural differences in groups. See Jan de Ruiter et al., 
Dunbar’s Number: Group Size and Brain Physiology in Humans Reexamined, 
113 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 557, 557–68 (2011). If anything, these questions seem 
more important in a group dealing with often-controversial issues tied up with 
questions of race, religion, and identity, like those worked on by Movimiento Co-
secha and IfNotNow. 
Falkvinge’s argument for working in middle-sized groups of thirty people—
which boils down to that number usually seeming to be manageable—may be his 
most compelling, despite not claiming any scientific or mathematical rationale. 
Id. at 155. 
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non-profit entities, in addition to the challenges of developing non-
profit corporate structures that align with their political values and 
that are functional and effective vehicles for their work, these groups 
and their lawyers must also ensure that these structures comply with 
the requirements of non-profit law and, when applicable, the addi-
tional legal requirements that come from exempt-organization tax 
law, employment law, and other bodies of law that become more 
challenging to navigate the more a group departs from conventional 
structures and practices.290  
Groups developing these new organizational structures must pay 
particular attention to ensuring that their structures permit directors 
to fully comply with their fiduciary duties, as it is here that these 
new structures make their riskiest departures from safe non-profit 
legal norms. Although it is clear that fiduciary duties require that 
corporate directors adhere to “something stricter than the morals of 
the market place[,]”291 the specific standards of care owed by direc-
tors of non-profit organizations to those organizations have changed 
over time.292 The long-term trend has seen non-profit directors inch-
ing toward being held to the same fiduciary standards as directors of 
business corporations,293 but in the twenty-first century, standards 
                                                                                                         
 290  Some of these new activist non-profits have obtained tax exemption from 
the IRS, and there is no reason that innovative corporate structures would prevent 
successfully obtaining tax exemption, although the governance rules specific to 
exempt organizations are an additional regulatory hurdle. See infra Section V.B.3. 
 291  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  
 292  See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: 
Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 893–94, 905 
(2007) (describing the trend toward imposing business standards on non-profit 
Boards and the costs of this trend on the charitable work of non-profits, noting 
that “there are many situations in which the rules applicable to for-profit organi-
zations fail to capture the needs of nonprofits”). While nineteenth century non-
profit governance relied heavily on stringent common law principles and charita-
ble trust standards, by the second half of the twentieth century, governance stand-
ards appeared to come closer to paralleling those of business corporations. See 
Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of 
Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 295–96 (2016). 
 293  The idea that the members of the governing body of a charitable corpora-
tion would owe corporate fiduciary duties rather than the duties of the trustees of 
a charitable trust would develop slowly, over the course of more than a century. 
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of care owed by non-profit and business corporate directors may be 
growing apart again, as new federal laws have imposed additional 
governance requirements on business corporations that exempt non-
profit corporations,294 and, at the same time, a new governance re-
gime has been imposed on tax-exempt non-profit Boards through 
the Internal Revenue Code.295 
This Part V divides the legal issues related to governance struc-
ture and fiduciary duties that face the new activist non-profits into 
two sections. Section V.A describes the duty of care, the duty likely 
most at risk of being breached by the structural innovations of these 
new activist non-profit models. Section V.B describes the duties of 
loyalty and obedience and the governance rules that apply to tax-
exempt organizations through the Internal Revenue Code, and dis-
cusses how these rules impact the new activist forms.  
A. The Duty of Care 
1. THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS 
Non-profit directors are required to act with care in how they 
govern a non-profit corporation.296 State laws vary in how they de-
                                                                                                         
Fishman, supra note 18, at 655. In New York, for instance, the 1895 Membership 
Corporation Law held that directors could be personally liable for short-term debts 
and they had to obtain court approval for leases longer than three years. Id. at 649. 
It took until the adoption of the 1970 Not-for-Profit Corporation Law for New 
York to use virtually the same requirements for directors’ standards of care and 
interested transaction rules as found in the New York Business Corporation Law. 
Id. at 649–50. 
 294  The governance reforms that were instituted after the corporate scandals of 
the early 2000s, including The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 were largely limited to 
publicly-held business corporations. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, 
Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at 
Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 358 (2012). 
 295  For a description of the governance rules that have been imposed through 
tax administration policies, see infra Section V.B.  
 296  MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).  
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scribe this duty, but most require that directors both act with reason-
ableness, judged by an “ordinarily prudent person in a like position” 
standard, and that they make their decisions based on a subjectively 
good faith belief that they are acting in the best interests of the cor-
poration.297 This duty is sometimes described as having two parts: 
(1) a duty of attention, a requirement that directors stay reasonably 
informed about the corporation, and (2) a duty of reasonable deci-
sion-making, a requirement that directors make decisions reasona-
bly believed to be in the best interests of the corporation.298  
There are multiple mechanisms that can shield directors from 
liability if they are found to have breached the duty of care. First, if 
directors are volunteers, as is typical for smaller non-profits, mere 
negligence may be insufficient to find a director personally liable, 
as courts do not want to discourage people from volunteering to 
serve on non-profit Boards.299 Second, directors are protected by the 
business judgment rule, sometimes called the “best judgment rule” 
in the non-profit context, which provides that directors are not liable 
for harm to the organization caused by a mistake of judgment as long 
as the director was reasonably informed about the subject of the de-
cision, there was no fraud or illegality in the decision, and the direc-
tor was able to exercise independent judgment without a disabling 
                                                                                                         
 297  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2019) (“A director shall per-
form . . . in a manner that director believes to be in the best interests of the corpo-
ration and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would use in similar circumstances.”); MINN. STAT. § 
317A.251 (2018) (“A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director 
in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances.”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CORP. § 717(a) (Consol. 2019) (“Directors and officers shall discharge the duties 
of their respective positions in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”). 
 298  Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 375. 
 299  See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th 
Cir. 1989). However, this is not a complete bar, and directors have on occasion 
been found personally liable for negligent management of assets. See, e.g., Lynch 
v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Vacco v. 
Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).  
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conflict of interest.300 Third, state and federal law offer protections 
to directors for violations of the duty of care. Many states provide 
statutory immunity from lawsuits based on allegations of the breach 
of the duty of care for directors of non-profit organizations, espe-
cially if they are serving without compensation.301 Similarly, the 
federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 shields directors of 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profits who receive no cash compensation 
or noncash compensation of no more than $500 per year from lia-
bility in many kinds of third-party lawsuits.302 Fourth, many state 
non-profit laws permit or require non-profit organizations to indem-
nify directors in certain situations,303 although such indemnification 
is only meaningful protection for directors of organizations with the 
financial resources to pay for the costs of indemnification. A non-
profit may obtain directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to fund 
those costs, and such policies should cover both potential liability 
and the costs of defending directors against a lawsuit.304 
All of these protections and officers provide a significant 
amount of safety for directors of non-profit organizations, making 
                                                                                                         
 300  Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003); Mahan 
v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150, 154 (S.D. 2001); Beard v. Achenbach 
Mem’l Hosp., 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 365 (AM. LAW INST. 2007).  
 301  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 29-406.90 (2019) (providing immunity for uncom-
pensated volunteers, including directors of non-profit organizations that maintain 
liability insurance); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-20.1 (2018) (providing immunity for 
uncompensated members, directors, trustees, and officers of non-profit hospitals 
and charities if they were acting in good faith and within the scope of their duties); 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.70 (2018) (providing immunity for directors and 
officers of tax-exempt non-profits if the director earns under $25,000 per year and 
the act or omission did not involve willful or wanton conduct). See generally, 
NONPROFIT RISK MGMT. CTR., STATE LIABILITY LAW FOR CHARITABLE ORGANI-
ZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS (2001), https://www.nonprofitrisk.org/app/uploads/ 
2017/01/state-liability-laws.pdf (last updated 2009) (describing protections from 
liability for nonprofits in various states).  
 302  42 U.S.C. §§ 14503(a), 14505(6) (2012).  
 303  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180 § 3 (2019); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CORP. § 722 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-881 (Consol. 2019).   
 304  AM. BAR ASS’N, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 16 (Victor 
Futter et al. eds, 2d ed. 2002). 
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service on a Board relatively low risk, even for directors who are not 
as active in providing oversight as might be ideal. Directors are gen-
erally permitted to rely on information prepared by employees, 
Board committees on which they do not serve, and on other compe-
tent persons without doing an independent investigation into the in-
formation reported to them.305 In addition, directors are not required 
to manage the day-to-day work of a non-profit organization, only to 
set broad organizational policies, oversee corporate agents, and pru-
dently select organizational managers.306 Directors of convention-
ally structured, professionalized non-profits fail to live up to these 
standards somewhat routinely.307 But the less conventionally struc-
tured an activist organization is, the more it may attract scrutiny, and 
these new activist non-profits should take steps to ensure their di-
rectors satisfy the duty of care.  
2. BEST PRACTICES FOR THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS  
TO SATISFY THE DUTY OF CARE 
Some of the new activist corporate structures may come close to 
delegating Board authority beyond what is allowed by the permis-
sive duty of care standard. In Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National 
Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,308 patients of a 
non-profit hospital sued its individual directors for failing to super-
vise management of the hospital’s investments, not even holding 
meetings of the relevant oversight committees for many years.309 
The court found that a “[t]otal abdication of the supervisory role” is 
                                                                                                         
 305  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5237, 7236, 9245 (2019); N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. § 719; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.33 (AM. BAR FOUND. 
2003). 
 306  AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORA-
TIONS 31 (William L. Boyd, III & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 3d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK]. 
 307  Id. at 31–33. The failure of directors to live up to this standard is recognized 
as a common problem, and directors are rarely found liable for such a failure ex-
cept in “the most egregious cases such as improper loans or distribution of corpo-
rate assets.” JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (5th ed. 2015). 
 308  381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 309  Id. at 1008. 
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a violation of the duty of care and that “[a] director who fails to ac-
quire the information necessary to supervise investment policy or 
consistently fails even to attend the meetings at which such policies 
are considered has violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation.”310 
Although directors are allowed to rely on the expertise of those to 
whom they have delegated responsibility, “such reliance is a tool for 
interpreting the delegate’s reports, not an excuse for dispensing with 
or ignoring such reports.”311 This has become the standard for per-
missible delegation in most states and under the Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act.312 
Some of the activist models considered in this Article already 
take steps to meet this standard. In the worker self-directed non-
profit model, the Board delegates governance power to “staff trus-
tees,” but the Board still maintains an oversight role, meets regu-
larly, and retains the power to rescind this delegation of authority.313 
This is likely permissible under the standards articulated in Stern, as 
the Board remains continuously involved in corporate oversight and 
retains the power to take action to correct the course of the organi-
zation, even if it would require a separate resolution to intervene.  
In the hub-and-spoke non-profit counter-institution model, the 
Board becomes one of many spokes, with management functions 
conducted by a collective comprised of delegates from the various 
affinity groups that comprise the organization as a whole.314 Alt-
hough this structure aims to segregate Board-specific duties like 
budgetary oversight and compliance in that Board affinity group, 
there is a risk that if affinity groups self-manage their projects with 
oversight given only by the collective hub, not the Board, directors 
could be found to have breached their duty of care by failing to pro-
vide adequate oversight of the organization’s activities. 
One way to mitigate that risk is demonstrated by SRLP. At 
SRLP, all teams meet twice yearly to present their work for the year 
                                                                                                         
 310  Id. at 1014. 
 311  Id. 
 312  MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 208 (2004).  
 313  See supra Part II. 
 314  See supra Part III. 
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and give progress reports, with the organization as a whole provid-
ing consensus approval to the “broad strokes” of programming.315 If 
the Board is informed about the activities of the various affinity 
groups or spokes of an organization on a semi-annual basis, and if it 
has the ability, through the consensus process, to block an action it 
finds contrary to the best interests of the organization, that is likely 
a sufficient level of oversight for the directors to fulfill their duty of 
care.316 This approach provides reasonable protection to their direc-
tors, and seems distinguishable from the total abandonment of Board 
involvement in Stern. 
More generally, the new activist non-profits—even if they in-
tentionally place their Boards at their organizational margins or strip 
them of many of their conventional powers—can take steps to min-
imize risk related to the duty of care. First, Boards should retain an 
ability to monitor organizational finances. Even if there is a substan-
tial delegation of authority over programming decisions compared 
to the norms of professionalized non-profits, if the Board monitors 
organizational finances, or receives and meaningfully reviews re-
ports from a committee or other group reasonably tasked with such 
monitoring, directors are likely to not be found liable for a breach of 
the duty of care, as directors are rarely found to have breached the 
duty of care except in cases of significant financial improprieties, 
such as “improper loans or distribution of corporate assets.”317  
Similarly, Boards should meet at least annually to review all im-
portant organizational or governance matters that have been worked 
on by committees, Circles, spokes, members, or any other non-
Board groups.318 In that review, directors should make sure they are 
meeting the requirements of the business judgment rule: they have 
                                                                                                         
 315  See supra Section III.B. 
 316  See supra Section III.B. 
 317  FISHMAN, SCHWARZ & MAYER, supra note 307, at 138.  
 318  There are many guides for non-profit directors that seek to explain their 
governance duties. For a detailed, book-length description, see AM. BAR ASS’N, 
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 306. For a brief overview of non-profit Boards’ annual 
requirements, see Michelle Berger, What Issues Should a Nonprofit Board Con-
sider Annually?, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nonprofitlaw-
blog.com/issues-nonprofit-board-consider-annually/. 
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made themselves reasonably informed about the subject of a deci-
sion, they have reviewed the decision to ensure there is no fraud or 
illegality, and they exercise independent judgment without a disa-
bling conflict of interest in their review.319 Groups considering pay-
ing their directors should also look at whether state or federal law 
would provide directors with additional protections if they are un-
compensated.320 Finally, like all non-profits, a non-profit experi-
menting with these new corporate structures should consider 
whether it must or should provide indemnification to their directors 
and whether to obtain directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to 
further protect their directors and officers.321 
Such efforts to ensure that directors satisfy their duty of care not 
only serve to protect an organization and its constituents financially 
and legally, but can also provide an opportunity for a meaningful 
review of decisions made by a decentralized or non-hierarchical or-
ganization. Activist non-profits should work to structure such re-
views so as not to be back-door efforts to reimpose hierarchy, but 
rather as mechanisms to bolster accountability within a decentral-
ized, non-hierarchical group, protecting against the kinds of dra-
matic missteps that have sometimes occurred when organizations 
operate solely through affinity group structures.322 
                                                                                                         
 319  See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 320  See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text. 
 321  See supra notes 303–04 and accompanying text.  
 322  One cautionary example is the Common Ground Collective, an autono-
mous mutual aid group in New Orleans that provided substantial storm recovery 
and rebuilding services after Hurricane Katrina. See Haber, supra note 25, at 346–
48 (citing SCOTT CROW, BLACK FLAGS AND WINDMILLS: HOPE, ANARCHY, AND 
THE COMMON GROUND COLLECTIVE (2011)). Members of the group began to 
manage a low-income housing development called the Woodlands Complex, 
which had fallen into serious disrepair after the storm, and spent hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars to do repairs based on an oral promise to sell the building to them 
by the owner of the complex. See Haber, supra note 25, at 347–48. After the col-
lective members made the repairs to the complex, the owner sold the building to 
a different owner and evicted the low-income tenants. Id.  
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B. Duties of Loyalty and Obedience, and Governance Obligations 
Arising from the Internal Revenue Code 
In addition to the duty of care, non-profit directors owe other 
fiduciary duties to their organizations, including the duties of loyalty 
and obedience, and duties arising from the Internal Revenue Code 
for certain tax-exempt organizations.  
1. DUTY OF LOYALTY 
The duty of loyalty addresses situations in which a director has 
a direct or indirect conflict of interest, and includes prohibitions on 
self-dealing and the usurpation of corporate opportunity.323 Loyalty 
should remain an important concern for the new activist non-profits. 
As with all non-profits, if a director or a family member of a director 
has a personal or financial interest in any matter coming before the 
Board or a committee of the Board, that director should disclose that 
interest and generally should not participate in any discussion of, or 
voting on, the possible approval of any transaction impacting that 
interest.324 For organizations that authorize committees, Circles, 
spokes, or any other non-Board groups to make significant expend-
itures, the non-profit should consider crafting conflict of interest 
policies covering those bodies. As part of the duty of loyalty, direc-
tors have an obligation to protect the confidentiality of private or-
ganizational information,325 and it may be that the more people who 
are permitted to participate in a decision-making process, the more 
likely it becomes that sensitive information may be disclosed; activ-
ist non-profits that permit many people to be involved in confiden-
tial deliberations should take steps to remind all such decision-mak-
ers of this duty, and should undertake measures to ensure that infor-
mation, data, and documents are stored securely.  
A related fiduciary duty that could arise as an issue in the context 
of activist organizations is what some call a “dual loyalty” or “di-
                                                                                                         
 323 Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 380–81. 
 324  See AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 306, at 43–48 (outlining best 
practices regarding the duty of loyalty).  
 325  Id. at 49. 
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vided allegiances”—not a conflict between a director’s personal fi-
nancial interest and that of the non-profit, but a conflict between a 
director’s involvement with multiple organizations that may cause 
that director to have loyalties to both groups or causes.326 Because 
people who participate in one activist organization sometimes have 
allegiances to multiple activist groups, activist non-profits should 
consider addressing the possibility of such conflicts in an organiza-
tional conflict of interest policy and ask directors to be sensitive to 
the potential for such conflicts.327  
2. DUTY OF OBEDIENCE 
The duty of obedience requires that directors ensure that corpo-
rate acts are lawful and not ultra vires, beyond the specified purpose 
and mission of the organization.328 Although this duty rarely comes 
up in court cases and is not codified in all state non-profit corpora-
tion statutes, state attorneys general with enforcement responsibili-
ties may monitor compliance with organizational purposes and mis-
sions, chiefly at moments of major corporate transitions, like mer-
gers and acquisitions, changes of corporate purpose, or upon disso-
lution.329 When a donor to an organization places restrictions on the 
uses of donated funds, the duty of obedience requires that directors 
make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with those re-
strictions,330 and, in states that have adopted the Uniform Prudent 
                                                                                                         
 326  See generally CLIFFORD S. GOLDFARB, DUAL LOYALTIES ON NON-PROFIT 
BOARDS: SERVING TWO MASTERS (2011), https://www.grllp.com/publica-
tions/Goldfarb_Dual_Loyalties_On_NonProfit_Boards_Final.pdf.  
 327  See, e.g., Policy Concerning Conflict of Interest and Divided Allegiance, 
AM. CTR. PHILANTHROPY BOARD 1–3, https://www.americancp.org/pdf/ACP-
Conflict-Interest-Statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (distinguishing con-
flict-of-interest and divided allegiance policies).  
 328  Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 388. 
 329  Id. at 389–90; see Sugin, supra note 292, at 899 (noting that even though 
the New York not-for-profit corporation law does not describe a duty of obedi-
ence, the state attorney general finds that the duty “may be inferred” from other 
provisions of the statute).  
 330  Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society 
vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1131 (2005).  
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Management of Institutional Funds Act, directors must also consider 
certain additional economic considerations.331  
The new activist non-profits may have cause to be more con-
cerned about the duty of obedience than conventionally structured 
non-profits. In a governance model where decisions may be made 
or new programs may be launched without close Board oversight, 
how can an organization ensure that it does not act ultra vires—out-
side of the organization’s corporate purpose and mission? The new 
activist non-profits may find some relief in the generally permissive 
trend in the law around non-profit corporate purposes: although cor-
porations are still not permitted to operate outside of the corporate 
purposes listed in their charters, it has become increasingly common 
for state non-profit statutes to permit the incorporation of a non-
profit for any lawful purpose, raising the issue of whether anything 
lawful could ever be ultra vires for an entity with such a broad cor-
porate purpose.332 Like in the context of business corporations 
where similarly permissive incorporation statutes have existed since 
the nineteenth century, concern about acting outside of an organiza-
tion’s corporate purposes may be an old paradigm, eclipsed by judi-
cial deference to the business judgment rule.333 For the new activist 
                                                                                                         
 331  UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3 (NAT’L CON-
FERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (requiring the Board to con-
sider investment decisions in relations to the organization’s overall portfolio, the 
economic circumstances at the time, and the charitable purposes of the organiza-
tion and the fund). 
 332  Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. 
L. REV. 497, 510 (1981) (noting that the trend, even in the early 1980s, was toward 
permitting non-profit incorporation for any lawful purpose); Alan R. Palmiter, 
Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 469 (2010) 
(arguing that the duty of obedience for non-profits “has come under attack for 
limiting non-profit adaptability”). For this reason, the Model Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Act, since its 1987 revision, has not recognized a non-profit duty of obedience 
separate from the duties of care and loyalty. Palmiter, supra, at 469. 
 333  For discussions of the decline of the doctrine of ultra vires in business cor-
porations, see, for example, JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:7 (3d ed. 2018); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 671 
(4th ed. 2003). Still, most states continue to have ultra vires rules in their corporate 
codes, permitting shareholder suits or action by a state Attorney General to enjoin 
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non-profits, the duty of obedience may require a degree of reporting 
the activities of relatively autonomous groupings like Circles or af-
finity groups to the larger body or Board and an attentiveness to the 
risks of breaching this duty.  
The duty of obedience also may include a general prohibition 
against directing the organization to engage in illegality.334 Alt-
hough this may sound like a concern for some activist non-profits, 
the duty of obedience likely does not prevent an activist organization 
from taking a principled stand against unjust laws or an unjust sys-
tem of laws, just as the duty of loyalty for business corporations does 
not prevent a corporation from openly disobeying a law in order to 
challenge its validity or application.335 In the activist non-profit con-
text, the decision to openly disobey a law as part of a campaign of 
civil disobedience or direct action that supports the organization’s 
goals should similarly not be considered a breach of the duty of obe-
dience.336 Still, it is a good practice for an organization interested in 
endorsing such acts to make it clear to members or others that par-
ticipation in such activities is always optional and that members 
might, depending on the context, risk arrest or other serious conse-
quences for actions they decide to take. 
                                                                                                         
a corporate act or dissolve a corporation, and such actions continue to be at least 
periodically litigated. Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking, 
and a Means of Circumventing the Scalia Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation, 
24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 75, 103–07 (2009). 
 334  Palmiter, supra note 332, at 460 (noting that corporations, since their be-
ginnings, were only allowed to engage in lawful business and that the duty of 
obedience has therefore always “called on fiduciaries to not permit corporate ille-
gality”). While this approach to the duty of obedience would make illegal acts 
also ultra vires, Palmiter notes that, like the rest of the ultra vires doctrine, the 
duty to not permit corporate illegality has largely “wilted away.” Id. 
 335  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01, cmt. g, 60–61 (1992). 
 336  There are surely limits to such an interpretation of the law: no matter how 
noble an organization's mission, a non-profit could not use “civil disobedience” 
as a shield to protect efforts to fraudulently induce people to donate to the organ-
ization. 
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3. GOVERNANCE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE  
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
The Internal Revenue Code has an additional impact on non-
profit corporate governance rules for organizations that maintain 
federal tax exemption. Organizations exempt from income tax pur-
suant to Internal Revenue Code 501(a), including most organiza-
tions (other than private foundations and black lung benefit trusts) 
described in any provision of 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1), must sub-
mit an annual information filing to the IRS on Form 990, 990-EZ, 
or 990-N.337 Starting in 2008, the IRS redesigned Form 990, adding 
a series of new questions concerning corporate governance, some 
derived from legislation, and others that “place[d] new and unde-
fined burdens on organizations.”338 These new provisions on Form 
990 ask organizations about how they make governance and other 
documents publicly available, conflicts of interest and interested di-
rector transactions, independent directors, document retention and 
destruction policies, Board review of the Form 990, whistleblower 
policies, and they impose additional documentation requirements.339  
Of these new provisions, the ones that may cause concern for the 
new activist non-profits are related to independent directors. To be 
considered an independent director by the IRS, a director must not 
be compensated in any way—including for employment—by the 
same or a related organization, must not receive total compensation 
or other payments of $10,000 during the organization’s tax year as 
an independent contractor, and neither that person nor any of his or 
her family members may be involved in a transaction with the or-
ganization.340 State corporate law in only a very few states require 
                                                                                                         
 337  See 2018 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i990.pdf (last visited Apr. 28. 2019).  
 338  James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Governance 
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX L. REV. 545, 568 (2010) [hereinafter Fishman, Stealth 
Preemption].  
 339  Id. at 569–78. 
 340  Id. at 570. 
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that a majority of non-profit directors meet this degree of independ-
ence.341 But while the IRS does require disclosure of interested di-
rectors, it only hints that it may be moving toward a Sarbanes-Ox-
ley-style regulatory regime that more closely regulates interested di-
rectors—nowhere does the IRS limit non-profits from having a 
Board comprised of non-independent directors.342 Indeed, for organ-
izations chartered in most states, the worker self-directed non-profit 
model developed by SELC could have been simplified; without the 
independent director requirement imposed by California law,343 
there is no legal need to have a majority-independent Board Circle 
in addition to an all-staff General Circle and Advisory Board, as 
SELC does.344  
VI. CONCLUSION: BREAKING FROM THE  
NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
The criticisms of the non-profit industrial complex may be at 
their most compelling when made by activists who have been pres-
sured to shoehorn their radical, anti-authoritarian, prefigurative pol-
itics into today’s dominant professionalized non-profit model.345 
                                                                                                         
 341  Id. at 572; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a) (West 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 13-
B, § 713-A(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 10-33-27(2) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11B, § 8.13(a) (2018). 
 342  Scholars have criticized the IRS for even hinting at undertaking this change 
without a statutory mandate to do so. Fishman, Stealth Preemption, supra note 
338, at 572; see generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the 
Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2007) (critiquing impo-
sition of independent director reforms on non-profits).  
 343  CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a). 
 344  See SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note 116, 
(arguing at 50:46–51:21 that “Board independence is considered a key safeguard 
against corruption, but can it actually undermine the nonprofit’s efficacy and ad-
vancing its mission? The people with the most interest in the organization’s suc-
cess are also most likely to be ‘interested persons’”). 
 345  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26, at 1–2 (describing how INCITE! Women 
of Color Against Violence had a grant award revoked by the Ford Foundation 
because someone on Ford Foundation’s Board objected to a statement of support 
for the Palestinian people on their website). 
2019] THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS 947 
Understandably, these activists’ criticisms of the non-profit indus-
trial complex sometimes conflate all possible versions of non-profit 
vehicles with the current norms of the professionalized non-profit 
sector in the United States.346 It is important to understand U.S. non-
profit norms in their historical context. The professionalized non-
profit model—with its hierarchy, employee leadership, dependency 
on grants and donations to such a degree that grantors and donors 
overly influence programmatic decision-making, and tendency to 
grow increasingly separate from the communities with the most at 
stake in their advocacy—may be the dominant form of non-profit 
organization, but this is not due to any inherent legal requirements 
of the form. In fact, the non-profit corporation in the United States 
developed in an earlier era, when non-profit groups were commonly 
member-led, community-driven, staffed by volunteers, and—while 
politically more often civic- or community-minded than radical—
often more democratic and participatory than many ostensibly “so-
cial justice” non-profits are today.347  
Since the rise in prominence of the activist criticisms of non-
profit norms that followed the development of the “non-profit in-
dustrial complex” label, activist skepticism of the non-profit corpo-
rate form has continued to grow. While some activists have chosen 
to work entirely outside of non-profit vehicles, such approaches are 
not always ideal. Other activists have experimented with new mod-
els for non-profit organizations, aiming to take advantage of the ben-
efits of the corporate form—limited liability, increased likelihood of 
obtaining tax exemption, greater ability to enter into contracts like 
commercial leases or to obtain funding like grants or loans—while 
at the same time departing from professionalized non-profit norms 
to try to be responsive to the criticisms of the non-profit industrial 
complex. 
                                                                                                         
 346  See Paula X. Rojas, Are the Cops in Our Heads and Hearts?, in THE REV-
OLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at 197, 207 (arguing that “it is 
important to be critical of the non-profit system, [but] we do not necessarily need 
to get rid of it all together. Revolutionary movements around the world use non-
profits (NGOs) as well, but they have a different relationship with them”).  
 347  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
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Section VI.A briefly describes seven best practices for these 
groups and, if they have them, their lawyers when considering how 
to structure activist organizations in line with the models described 
in this Article. Section VI.B concludes with a consideration of how 
these groups fit into larger questions about prefigurative politics and 
social movements. 
A. Seven Best Practices for the  
New Activist Non-Profits and Their Lawyers 
There are activist groups experimenting with new organizational 
structures around the country, and many are undertaking this work 
without legal counsel or, when fortunate enough to have access to a 
lawyer, without legal counsel who have thought in detail about ei-
ther the variety of potential structures that activists have been devel-
oping or all the legal ramifications that result from the changes these 
groups are seeking to make. Although this Article has largely fo-
cused on presenting some of the existing options for organizational 
structure for these new activist non-profits, representing these 
groups well requires going beyond simply counseling them on the 
flexibility of non-profit corporate law and hammering out corporate 
structures that seem to meet their goals. To conclude, this Article 
offers seven considerations that the new activist non-profits and 
their lawyers should bear in mind when working to plan and develop 
these groups.  
1. PLAN AHEAD FOR GROWTH 
It is hard for any group to predict future growth, but because the 
different structures described in this Article grow to scale very dif-
ferently, it is critical to do both short- and longer-term planning. It 
would likely be impossible for a worker self-directed non-profit to 
have all workers meet to discuss fairly routine matters in an organi-
zation with 10,000 employees.348 Conversely, the great strength of 
the swarm organization structure is its scalability, and organizations 
structured using that model have the potential to become large.349 
                                                                                                         
 348  See supra Section II.A.3. 
 349  See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text. 
2019] THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS 949 
The swarm organization model, however, is driven by volunteers or 
members, not employees, so it is not a great choice for every group. 
The new activist non-profits should try to realistically anticipate 
how they think their project should grow and plan ahead to support 
that expansion as they decide on organizational structures.  
2. DON’T GET BOGGED DOWN IN TERMINOLOGY AND METAPHOR 
Too many activist groups get sidetracked with debates over ter-
minology, like whether to make decisions by “consent,” “consen-
sus,” or “modified consensus,” or whether to have a “Board, “hub,” 
or “core collective.” These labels matter, but they ultimately matter 
less than the specific rules and policies the group adopts. Spend 
more time defining specific processes than debating abstract labels 
that quite often come with different connotations for different peo-
ple. Similarly, do not dedicate too much time to metaphorical think-
ing: it is not always a good use of time to debate whether to call a 
group a swarm or a hive, or to discuss whether a group that might 
be part of a social movement ecosystem is more like a root or a veg-
etable or fertilizer. Metaphors can help people understand compli-
cated topics at times, but developing specific goals and plans are 
often a better use of a group’s time than elaborate metaphors.  
3. MONITOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
As described in Part V, groups that are exploring these new mod-
els should make sure that their Boards satisfy their fiduciary duties. 
For all of the corporate forms described in this Article, one of the 
commonalities that carries some legal risk is the marginalizing or 
minimizing of the role of the Board. In each model, there are mech-
anisms that can be used to try to ensure that directors are fulfilling 
their duties, but organizations should not lose sight of the im-
portance of following through on those steps. The following are 
some good practices for all of these groups to implement: having a 
mechanism for Board monitoring of organizational finances; hold-
ing at least one annual Board meeting to review important organiza-
tional matters that may have been worked on by others in the organ-
ization; making sure to be reasonably informed about the subjects of 
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decisions without a disabling conflict of interest; and being careful 
with confidential information.350 
4. GOOD STRUCTURES ARE NOT  
SUBSTITUTES FOR MUTUAL RESPECT 
The real-world interior lives of social change organizations can 
fluctuate and be messy, driven by specific personalities and conflicts 
that arise from specific contexts.351 Whatever structure a group pur-
sues, there needs to be a focus not only on structure, but also on 
having those interpersonal relationships be healthy ones, built on 
collaboration, respect, and solidarity. While helping groups to man-
age those relationships might not always be the right role for a law-
yer doing this work, lawyers for these groups must be attentive to 
just how essential healthy, collaborative relationships can be to or-
ganizational strength and success. There are activist texts that dis-
cuss developing these relationships that are good starting points for 
any of these groups to consult.352  
5. CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING IS IMPERFECT TOO 
Activists have long considered consensus to be a better decision-
making tool than majority voting because consensus aims to max-
imize individual autonomy and the participation of all members of 
a group.353 But consensus decision-making comes with downsides 
as well. First, consensus can lead a group to inaction if members are 
thinking of the process as more like a unanimous vote than a proce-
dure for soliciting group feedback in order to modify plans so that 
                                                                                                         
 350  See generally Part V.  
 351  For a thoughtful reminder of the need to balance democratic processes and 
the immediate material aims of communities in crisis, see generally Barbara 
Bezdek, Digging into Democracy: Reflections on CED and Social Change Law-
yering After #OWS, 77 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 16 (2018). 
 352  See generally, e.g., SEEDS FOR CHANGE, A CONSENSUS HANDBOOK: CO-
OPERATIVE DECISION-MAKING FOR ACTIVISTS, CO-OPS AND COMMUNITIES 
(2013); DELFINA VANNUCCI & RICHARD SINGER, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: 
A HANDBOOK ON COLLECTIVE PROCESS GONE AWRY (2010). 
 353  VANNUCCI & SINGER, supra note 352, at 19.  
2019] THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS 951 
they become reasonably acceptable to all group members.354 When 
blocks are not reserved for very rare occasions, a consensus or Con-
sent process can destroy a group’s ability to work with any effi-
ciency at all.355 Second, consensus decision-making can sometimes 
lead to groupthink: group members may withhold good-faith objec-
tions to a proposal because they do not want to block something that 
most members of the group support; the good thing about a simple 
up-or-down vote is that it allows a member to quickly and easily 
express doubts about a proposal without derailing something sup-
ported by nearly everyone else.356 This is not to say that majority or 
supermajority voting is better than consensus, but rather that no 
model for decision-making is perfect, and activist groups should 
think carefully about what will work best for them and their mem-
bers.  
6. LEARN FROM OTHER GROUPS AND DON’T THROW OUT  
THE GOOD WITH THE BAD 
Activist groups that are committed to building non-profit struc-
tures that align with their values can sometimes feel like they are 
starting from scratch, without any effective models on which to 
build. But models for these organizations do exist; the structures de-
scribed in this Article present some starting points for activist groups 
exploring these frameworks. Activists should share their experi-
ments and takeaways with one another, as many of the groups de-
scribed in this Article have done. Beyond that, some of the practices 
of conventionally structured, professionalized non-profits might be 
revisited within the context of these new experiments with structure: 
just because elected corporate officers are sometimes symptoms of 
a problematic organizational hierarchy does not mean that having a 
person who is elected by a majority vote to take notes at group meet-
ings is somehow an inherently flawed idea.  
                                                                                                         
 354  See Haber, supra note 25, at 335. 
 355  Id. 
 356  VANNUCCI & SINGER, supra note 352, at 19–21.  
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7. LAWYERS, REMEMBER MOVEMENT LAWYERING 
Since the early 2000s, lawyers committed to social change law-
yering have increasingly come to frame their work as “movement 
lawyering,” the “representation of mobilized clients and the use of 
integrated advocacy . . . [a] version of cause lawyering in which the 
cause is defined and advanced by social movement leaders and con-
stituents in dynamic processes of grassroots organization building 
and community engagement.”357 This Article describes the repre-
sentation of mobilized clients but a mode of lawyering that could be 
interpreted to be actually quite traditional: providing legal assistance 
to an organization considering whether to incorporate and how to 
structure that corporate entity to meet the organization’s goals. Ac-
tivist organizations do sometimes engage corporate lawyers on such 
a limited, transactional basis—likely to the detriment of an organi-
zation that could benefit from a lawyer with a deeper understanding 
of their activist values and political vision.  
While movement lawyers can and do engage in traditional forms 
of advocacy on behalf of mobilized clients, the core of the advocacy 
model of movement lawyers is to break down barriers between law-
yers and non-lawyers, litigation and other forms of advocacy, to-
ward the ultimate goal of “producing more democratic and sustain-
able social change.”358 Movement lawyers with the corporate and 
transactional legal expertise that is essential to helping movement 
groups navigate these issues should not limit their work narrowly, 
but should look for opportunities to further collaborate with these 
groups toward precisely those goals. 
B. The New Activist Non-Profits, Prefigurative Politics,  
and Law and Social Movements 
The relationships between non-profit organizations, social 
movements, and prefigurative politics can be complicated, and ar-
guments about them too often rely on overgeneralizations. Some un-
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critically accept the conventional wisdom that participatory democ-
racy, prefigurative politics, and non-hierarchical or decentralized or-
ganizations are, at best, good-on-paper theories that ignore the real 
needs of low-income communities and communities of color.359 
Similar criticisms have been around since at least the 1960s.360 In 
the mid-1960s, African-American activists within the Student Non-
violent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”) did indeed challenge 
white organizational leaders who focused on internal participatory 
democracy while retaining their privileged leadership roles—criti-
cizing endless debate among the mostly-white “children of the mid-
dle class with the middle class intellectual penchant for nuance[.]”361 
But to draw a straight line from SNCC to the Occupy Movement 
and write off prefigurative politics entirely as disconnected from the 
real struggles of communities in crisis erases the entire tradition of 
women-of-color feminism, 1980s AIDS activists, 1990s Zapatis-
tas,362 and recent environmental activism led by indigenous North 
American communities,363 and ignores the work of some of the 
greatest leaders of the Civil Rights Era, figures like Ella Baker and 
Myles Horton, who sought to focus on local organizing while main-
taining a radical, national vision for social change, and who always 
“treated participatory decisionmaking both as a strategy and as an 
end in itself.”364  
Of course, the debates over the merits of participatory democ-
racy that occupied many within SNCC and the New Left are more 
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than fifty years old, and our political context today is radically dif-
ferent. In comparison to the 1960s, for even many activists in to-
day’s political climate, the idea of a movement for meaningful social 
change feels naïve: “the elevated language of hope in a systemic al-
ternative ‘rings oddly in our ears.’”365 Today, we do not only need 
“structures to more effectively organize and mobilize strug-
gles . . . but transcending pessimism . . . needs an animating vision 
as well, a utopia that is both dream and possible reality.”366 The ex-
periments described in this Article may be some early efforts toward 
such a vision, ways of developing new structures for both mobiliza-
tion and developing a community that point toward that possible fu-
ture. Movement lawyers familiar with the models described in this 
Article—and all of their benefits, challenges, risks, and areas of con-
cern—can collaborate with activist groups experimenting with these 
models to not only support the shaping of effective organizational 
structures that meet the visions of these groups, but do so in a way 
that causes the fewest legal challenges for those groups as they 
grow.  
While many activists rightfully remain skeptical about non-
profit corporations, compliance, and tax-exemption in light of the 
important criticisms of the non-profit industrial complex, innovative 
activist groups around the country have been engaged in a long se-
ries of radical experiments, exploring ways that groups can take ad-
vantage of the benefits of the non-profit corporate form while avoid-
ing many of its most problematic effects. The non-profit corpora-
tion—that old relic of our grandparents’ dusty civic association 
meetings and the well-meaning community-based organizations that 
grew to scale out of the radical 1960s only to sometimes become so 
focused on fundraising that they lost perspective on the most essen-
tial need for political vision and community mobilization—may be, 
after all, the shell in which we begin to build the new world.  
 
                                                                                                         
 365  Sam Gindin, We Need to Say What Socialism Will Look Like, JACOBIN, 
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/03/sam-gindin-socialist-planning-models (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 366  Id. 
